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COMMENTS
The Federal Class Action in Environmental Litigation:
Problems and Possibilities
As the first great wave of environmental litigation surged across
the nation in the early years of this decade, concerned lawyers and legal
scholars alike began to characterize the class action as "the most important device for the declaration of environmental rights." 1 Some
lawyers specializing in environmental litigation apparently attempt to
force every lawsuit into the limited mold of a rule 23 class action,2
which may result in the absurd situation of a handful of persons purporting to represent the entire population of the United States. 3 The
reaction of many judges has been predictably negative when faced with
these massive class suits seeking redress for environmental harm.
A recent case in the Second Circuit, Zahn v. InternationalPaper
Co.,4 is illustrative. Four named owners of lakefront property attempted to bring a class suit on behalf of some two hundred other lakefront property owners, seeking damages in the total amount of forty
million dollars, for impairment of their property rights caused by the
defendant's alleged pollution of Lake Champlain. The trial judge
had found that, although the four named plaintiffs had each made good
faith claims of damages in excess of ten thousand dollars, it was impossible that every member of the class had suffered pollution dam1. V. YANNACONE & B. COHEN, 1 ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHrsAND REMEDIES, § 6:10,
at 363 (1972).
See J. MACDONALD & J. CoNWAY, ENVrRoNMENTAL LTGATION
§§ 2.04a, 4.50 (1972); Ashe, The Class Action: Solution for the Seventies, 7 N.E.L.
REv. 1 (1971); Larnm & Davison, Environmental Class Actions Seeking Damages, 16
RocKY MT. MIN. L. INsT. 59 (1971); Comment, The Viability of Class Actions in
Environmental Litigation, 2 EcoL. L.Q. 533 (1972); Note, The Cost-Internalization
Case for Class Actions, 21 STAN. L. REV. 383 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Cost Internalization]; Comment, The Environmental Lawsuit: Traditional Doctrines and
Evolving Theories to Control Pollution, 16 WAYNE L. REV. 1085, 1097-98 (1970).
2. Victor Yannacone, one of the most ubiquitous litigators in the limited group
of nationally known environmental lawyers, brings every action that comes into his
office "on behalf of all those entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of whatever national natural resource treasure is involved . . . ." Remarks during panel
discussion recorded in LAW AND TE ENVIRONMENT 75 (M. Baldwin & J.Page eds.
1970).
3. E.g., Yannacone v. Montrose Chem. Co., No. 3761-69 (S.D.N.Y., filed Oct.
14, 1969); see discussion in text at notes 183-84 infra.
4. 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. granted, 93 S. Ct. 1370 (1973) (No.
72-888).
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age in that amount.5 Holding that Snyder v. Harris required that
each class member in a federal diversity suit must meet the ten thousand dollar jurisdictional amount, the court refused to allow the suit
to proceed as a class action. 7
This decision is an ominous portent of things to come for environmentalists eager to expand the use of class actions. Perhaps most
striking is the fact that it came from the Second Circuit, which has been
the leader in giving rule 23 "a liberal rather than a restrictive interpretation,"'8 particularly in the securities fraud and antitrust fields. Even
more disturbing than the narrow holding itself, which might be excused as no more than a technical interpretation of the jurisdictional
amount requirement, 9 is the attitude revealed in the court's concluding
dicta:
However, were this case to proceed as a class action it would in
fact significantly increase the burden on the federal courts. Once
appellee's liability had been established, and even assuming that
appellee's defenses would not vary as to different members of
appellants' class, it would be an enormously time consuming task
to assess the damages suffered by each of the 200 riparian landowners, each of whose claims is regarded as separate and distinct.
Indeed the Advisory Committee did not intend that Rule 23(b)
(3) ordinarily be utilized in a mass tort situation. Moreover a
second policy consideration relied on in Snyder is relevant here:
local controversies involving claims to be settled on the basis of
state law "can often be most appropriately tried in state courts."' 0
If the most liberal court of appeals takes the foregoing approach when
confronted with a class of only two hundred members and a fairly
straightforward and egregious case of injury to property caused by one
polluter, it does not require great prescience to imagine what other
courts might do with class actions on behalf of millions who allege
more obscure personal injuries and aesthetic damage caused by a num5. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 53 F.R.D. 430, 431 (D. Vt. 1971).
6. 394 U.S. 332 (1969); see text accompanying notes 70-134 infra for a full
discussion of the Snyder decision and its impact on the jurisdictional amount requirement for class suits.
7. 469 F.2d at 1034.
8. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 563 (2d Cir. 1968) (Eisen H).
Despite its "liberal" attitude to Rule 23, the Second Circuit recently reversed the
District Court and dismissed the action. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, Civil Nos.
72-1521, 30934 (2d Cir., May 1, 1973) (Eisen HI). See discussion in text accompanying notes 312-19 and 337-44.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
10. 469 F.2d at 1035-36 (citations omitted).
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ber of polluters in an urban area. 1 '
Nevertheless, this comment is not intended as a requiem for the
environmental class action. The device has a place in environmental
litigation even though recent developments have limited its utility. Litigants who enter the courtroom on the side of the environment face
enormous obstacles without further deluding themselves as to the magical effects of the class suit. They must be more aware of the strategic
strengths and weaknesses of the class action device, as well as the
highly technical requirements for its use in the federal courts, if the
class suit is to realize its potential in this field of law.
Part I of this comment considers the various purposes that have
been suggested as justification for the use of class actions. Part II
deals with two threshold matters: federal jurisdiction, with particular
attention to the issue of jurisdictional amount in establishing diversity
jurisdiction, and modem rules on "standing." Part III is a section-bysection analysis of the requirements of rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
I.

A.

SOME SUGGESTED PURPOSES OF THE CLASS SUIT

Traditional View

Although amended rule 23, the basis for class actions in the federal courts, is only seven years old, the origins of this procedural de12
vice can be traced back some 300 years to the English equity courts.
The class action was an invention of equity.

. .

mothered by the

practical necessity of providing a procedural device so that mere
numbers would not disable large groups of individuals, united in
interest, from enforcing their equitable rights nor grant them immunity from their equitable wrongs.' 3
In order to avoid the wasted effort of a series of essentially identical
lawsuits that might follow when many persons stood in the same position toward an adversary, the English Court of Chancery relaxed the
older rules requiring joinder of all interested parties and developed the
11. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. General Motors Corp., 467 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir.
1971); Heart Disease Research Foundation v.
1972), afj'g 332 F. Supp. 285 (N.D. Ill.
General Motors Corp., 3 E.R.C. 1710 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Diamond v. General Motors
Corp., 20 Cal. App. 3d 374, 97 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1971) (all dismissed); see discussion
in text accompanying notes 300-03 infra.
12. Precise dating is impossible, but sometime between 1675 and 1700 class
actions seems to have begun to branch off from bills of peace. See Z. CHAFFEE, SOME
PROBLEMS OF EQurry,157-66 (1950) and cases there cited, especially in n.29.
13. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182, 187 (8th Cir. 1948).
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bill of peace, which allowed the court to clear up the rights of many

plaintiffs or defendants in a single action. 14 The class action gradually
evolved from the bill of peace.
The obvious advantages of the class action were recognized by

the American judiciary at an early date. Equity rules authorized class
actions in the federal courts for suits involving so many parties that it
was impractical to join them all as parties.' 5 The representative suit
took on more definite form in 1938 when the Supreme Court adopted
original rule 23,16 described by one leading commentator as "a bold

and well-intentioned attempt to encourage more frequent use of class
actions.'

7

After three decades of experience revealed very serious de-

fects in the original rule,'8 the provisions were completely rewritten
and augmented in the present form in 1966.19
20
Like its forerunners, amended rule 23 is a rule of convenience,

designed to "achieve economies of time, effort and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated ....,,21
A federal trial judge recently said that the purposes of rule 23 "are

to avoid a multiplicity of suits, provide common binding adjudication,
and prevent inconsistent or varying adjudications. ' 22 While the rule
may help to achieve the last two objectives, it most definitely does not
14. Z. CHAFFEE, supra note 12, at 200-01; Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil
Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARv.
L. REV. 356, 376 (1967).

15. Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921); Z. CAFFnn,
supra note 12, at 220-42; Wheaton, Representative Suits Involving Numerous Litigants,
19 CORNELL L.Q. 399 (1934).
16. Rule 23 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United
States, 308 U.S. 645, 689-90 (1938).
17. 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:

CIVIL

§ 1732 (1972) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER].
18. Z. CHAFFEE, supra note 12, at 199-295; see The Advisory Committee Note to
the 1966 amendment to rule 23, 39 F.R.D. 69, 98-107 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Advisory Committee Note]. See further discussion in text accompanying notes 70-79
infra.
19. 383 U.S. 1031, 1047 (1966); Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39 (1967); Kaplan, supra note 14, at 375-400. The
revised rule 23 is reproduced in part at note 170 infra.
20. See Krahmer, Some Problems of Consumer Class Actions, 7 U. RIcH. L. REV.
213-16 (1972).
21. Advisory Committee Note 102. See also the comment of Prof. Kaplan, the
reporter for the Advisory Committee at the time of the 1966 amendments:
The object [of rule 23(b)(3)] is to get at the cases where a class action
promises important advantages of economy of effort and uniformity of result
without undue dilution of procedural safeguards for members of the class or
for the opposing party.
Kaplan, supra note 14, at 390.
22. Mungin v. Florida E. C. Ry., 318 F. Supp. 720, 730 (M.D. Fla. 1970),
aff'd per curiam, 441 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1971).

1973]

ENVIRONMENTAL CLASS ACTION

1389

result in economies of time and effort, nor does it avoid a multiplicity
of suits.23 Rather than reducing the number of suits, the amended

rule "has fostered a flood in class litigations which would not otherwise have been brought. '24 A statistical study on class actions in the
Southern District of New York, for example, revealed that from 1967
to 1971 the number of class actions filed in that district increased fourfold. 25
Class actions have mushroomed because many judges and legal
scholars have interpreted rule 23 with another objective in mind: to
provide a remedy for those whose claim is too small to justify individual litigation and who would otherwise not be involved in judicial
proceedings." Judge Frankel attributes to Professor Kaplan, the re-

porter for the Advisory Committee at the time of the 1966 amendments,
the statement that the class action's "historic mission [has been] taking
'27
care of the smaller guy."

For a while this approach seemed to hold the key to the pollution
control crises. Those who stand on the side of the environment28
have one perennial problem: a shortage of funds with which to finance
litigation against large polluters, who are normally well-represented by

skilled legal counsel and prepared to put up a good defense.

Court

23. Blecher, Is the Class Action Rule Doing the Job? (Plaintiff's Viewpoint), 55
F.R.D. 365 (1972). Blecher sees no cause for alarm in the failure of the new rule
to achieve the traditional objectives: "Frankly, however, the purpose of the rule as
set out in the Advisory Notes is, in my view, utopian on the one hand and of relatively
modest importance on the other. . . . A judicial system which becomes consumed with
"economies of time and effort" as its major objective soon loses sight of the real purpose
it serves." Id.
24. Simon, Class Actions-Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D.
375, 377 (1972).
25. See AmmRIcAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT & REcOMiMENDATIONS OF
THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON RULE

23

OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

(1972). The Report also indicates that more than 53 per cent of the actions commenced in 1966 were still pending in 1971.
26. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 560 (2d Cir. 1968); see
Esplin v. Hirsehi, 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969);
Ford, Federal Rule 23: A Device for Aiding the Small Claimant, 10 B.C. IND. &
COM. L. REV. 501 (1969); Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the
Class Suit, 8 U. Cm. L. REV. 684 (1941). An environmental case rejecting the small
claimant rationale is Bailey v. Sabine River Authority, 54 F.R.D. 42, 43 (W.D. La.
1971), where the judge held "[i]t is not the purpose of the class action to save every
suit from dismissal because it is too insignificant to receive its own day in federal
court." See also Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, Civil Nos. 72-1521, 30934 (2d Cir.,
May 1, 1973), rev'g 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), discussed in the text accompanying
notes 312-19 and 337-44.
27. Frankel, Amended Rule 23 from a Judge's Point of View, 32 ANTITRUST L.J.
295, 299 (1966).
28. See Comment, Standing on the Side of the Environment: A Statutory Prescriptionfor Citizen Participation,1 EcoL. L.Q. 561 (1971).
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costs, expert witness fees, costs of transcripts, and minimal legal fees
may total fifty to one hundred thousand dollars in a major case.20
The class action allows the "small fellows," each injured too little to
make an individual lawsuit worthwhile, to pool their resources. In
practical terms, it provides the means whereby the few individuals really
concerned about, for example, a fuming cement plant80 can attract
an attorney by the prospect of the substantial contingent fee81 that
normally follows a successful class suit for damages. Although each
individual may claim only one thousand dollars in damages, a class of
ten thousand persons may sue for ten million dollars; sums of that
magnitude arouse the interest of many lawyers.
The Supreme Court's decision in Snyder v. Harris2 sharply curtailed the use of rule 23 class actions by small claimants. The Court
held that in diversity cases the class members cannot aggregate their
claims to reach the ten thousand dollar jurisdictional minimum unless
they share a common and undivided interest, an unlikely event in environmental litigation. As will be discussed more fully in Part I of
this comment, the practical effect of the Snyder decision is to fence all
but the unusually large "small claimants" out of the federal courts."8
This is not to derogate the value of a class action in these rare cases;
even if a number of persons have suffered injuries from pollution somewhat in excess of ten thousand dollars each, no one of them alone
could hope to finance a successful suit against a large corporation.
Furthermore, the class action for injunctive relief, rather than damages, may still be viable and will validly serve the needs of many small
plaintiffs who are willing to forego damages if a source of pollution
can be shut down. 4 The overall effect of Snyder, however, is clearly
to frustrate the potential many lawyers and commentators saw in
amended rule 23.
B. Modern Economic Justification
The economic concept of "externalities" has become increasingly
popular among legal scholars attempting to allocate properly the liabil29. LAw AND TnE ENvmoNMENT, supra note 2, at 85-87.
30. See generally Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d
870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
31. See Simon, supra note 24, at 391-92.
32. 394 U.S. 332 (1969). See text accompanying notes 70-89 infra.
33. Snyder had no effect on federally created claims, so the small claimant
rationale still has validity in, for example, class actions for damages under the antitrust and securities fraud statutes.
34. See text accompanying notes 84-94 infra.
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ity for pollution."" If a food processor chooses not to treat the noxious
wastes resulting from its operations but instead dumps the sewage into
a nearby stream,8 6 this is an example of what economists call an external diseconomy 37-a cost of production borne not by the business
activity but by the public at large. This form of public subsidy, which
provides an economic windfall to many enterprises, disturbs economists
because it distorts the price mechanism, resulting in a misallocation of
resources. Society is diverting too many resources into this food processor because his prices do not accurately reflect the total economic
and social cost of the business.
If on the other hand the polluter had to pay, through the imposition of money damages, for the mental, physical, and ecological
damage caused by him, several results would appear. First, if
the costs of the penalties assessed against polluters were greater
than the costs of pollution control equipment, the polluter would
rationally choose to increase net profits by purchasing such equipment. Second, if all polluters were assessed these costs, a highly
innovative pollution control industry would be created in response
to the great demand for cheaper and more efficient pollution control devices. Third, in the long run the forced internalization of
pollution costs would increase the sales of nonpolluting industries
since consumer demand, unless inelastic, would shift toward goods
whose price did not include the costly surcharge of court-imposed
pollution damages. 88
One of the primary functions of a legal system, then, should be to
force the polluter to internalize all of his costs.8 9 The common law
has not been oblivious to the social costs imposed by private profit
seeking. The civil action for damages or injunctive relief on the theories of nuisance, negligence, or trespass has long been available as a
means to internalize certain external costs and incorporate certain harmful side effects into the cost benefit calculations of industrial enterprises, although not with that avowed purpose.4"
35. E.g., Esposito, Air & Water Pollution: What to Do While Waiting for Washington, 5 HARV. Crv. RiGHTs-Cv. Lm. L. REV. 32, 34-36 (1970); Katz, The Func-

tion of Tort Liability in Technology Assessment, 38 U. CIN. L. REv. 587, 606-22
(1969); McCarthy, Recent Legal Developments in Environmental Defense, 19 BUrF.
L. REV. 195, 201 (1969); Cost Internalization, supra note 1; Michelman, Book
Review, 80 YALE L.J. 647, 666-86 (1971).
36. See, e.g., Ratzlaff v. Franz Foods, 250 Ark. 1003, 468 S.W.2d 239 (1971).
37. E.g., A. PIGou, TnE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 160-61 (1932).
38. Esposito, supra note 35, at 34-35.
39. Baxter, The SST: From Watts to Harlem in Two Hours, 21 STAN. L. R.
1, 39 (1968).
40. See Juergensmeyer, Control of Air Pollution Through Assertion of Private
Rights, 1967 DuxE L.J. 1126.
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There is at least the potential that these "internalizing" suits may
become common enough to provide effective deterrents to the industrial pollution of the environment. This potential will never be fully
realized, nor wil the entire social cost of a defendant's pollution be
assessed, however, so long as these suits are brought by one or two
plaintiffs clustered near a factory. If polluters face the threat of paying
damages only to a few persons, they will continue to echo the remarks
of the manager of a Reynolds Metals plant who, quite accurately, stated:
'4
"It is cheaper to pay claims than it is to control fluorides." 1
The class action has some potential for forcing a company to internalize more of these external social costs, thereby making the private lawsuit a more effective deterrent and allowing the price mechanism to allocate economic resources properly. In a persuasive note4 2
that thoroughly develops the economic theory surrounding the concept
of externalities, a student writer has concluded that this economic theory provides a satisfactory rationale for class suits which is lacking in
the traditional justifications.
It is only where a broader issue of public policy, or some therapeutic function, is envisioned that the courts can be expected to
be receptive to cumbersome class suits.
The economics of externality costs provide a suitable policy
focus. The concept is not obscure; it is precisely the same as that
stressed in Dolgow v. Anderson: Damages prevent the insider,
the oligopolist, the polluter, and the airline from acting in a manner
that exploits weaknesses in the market system. That effect is the
same whether or not the damages are ever paid to the small
claimant in an amount equal to the losses he sustains. If the
policies against burdensome litigation and claim solicitation outweigh the public interest in an efficient economy, many class suits
may properly be dismissed, but at least the efficiency considera48
tion should be given a place in the judicial balance.
Although the internalization argument has been urged upon at
least one court in support of a plea for allowance of a massive class
action against pollutors, 44 there is no indication that any court has
41. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Lampert, 324 F.2d 465, 466 (9th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 910 (1964). This sentence, one of the most quoted lines in the field
of environmental law, was largely responsible for an award of punitive damages to
the plaintiffs, a result which at least partially refutes the boast.
42. Cost Internalization,supra note 1.
43. Cost internalization419 (cites omitted).
44. Diamond v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. App. 3d 374, 97 Cal. Rptr. 639
(1971). In this case, brought by one young lawyer on behalf of the population of
Los Angeles (7,119,184 persons) against 293 polluters, the defendants demurrer was
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accepted the rationale to this time. Unfortunately, the prospects for the
future do not look bright. Most commentators suggest that the class
action can function most effectively as an internalizer in the context of

a lawsuit seeking relief in damages.45 Yet in the federal courts, in addition to the normal reluctance of most judges to undertake these enor-

mous class suits for damages, the jurisdictional amount requirement of
40 arises to block most environmental litigation.
Class
Snyder v. Harris
actions based on state law -are not subject to the limitations expressed
in Snyder, of course, but one scholar has observed that "state class
action doctrines are presently even less viable than was the federal pro-

vision before Snyder, although there may remain considerable room for
innovation in the state courts.

'47

sustained by the court. In plaintiff's Memorandum of Law, the attorney wrote:
Plaintiff respectfully suggests that the court read the "Class Action," Stanford
Law Review article, for it deals primarily with the utility and desirability of
employing the class action device against those dumping their garbage into the
atmosphere. "Air pollution imposes on outsiders an uncompensated cost that
is not subject to any pricing mechanism. Many of those who are presently
using the atmosphere for waste disposal are not required to pay for the
privilege; conversely, there is no effective means whereby other air users may
offer payment to stop the pollution.
Quoted in N. LANDAU & P. RHEINGOLD, THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK (1971).
45. E.g., Comment, 3 ECOL. L.Q., supra note 1, at 542-43.
46. 394 U.S. 332 (1969). See text accompanying notes 32-34 supra and 70-89
infra.
47. Esposito, supra note 34, at 36. The prospects for environmental class actions
in the state courts are not uniformly bleak, however, as the following case summaries
indicate:
The four petroleum firms sharing the oil drilling platform which caused the
massive Santa Barbara, California, oil spill in 1969 agreed to pay 1,560 beachfront
property owners a total of four and one-half million dollars damages in settlement of a
class suit. The plaintiffs had sought 105 million dollars in damages. Washington
Post, Nov. 26, 1971, at A24, col. 1.
The owners of 520 parcels of land in the path of jets taking off from Los
Angeles International Airport were awarded damages totaling $659,000 against the
City of Los Angeles. 2 Env. Rep.-Car. Dev. 1049 (1971).
The California Supreme Court ruled that property owners aggrieved by noise,
fumes and vibrations coming from a city airport may bring a class suit for damages
under the nuisance theory. The action was brought on behalf of seven hundred persons
against the City of Santa Monica for property and personal injury damages. The trial
court rejected defense motions to dismiss the class because of its great size. The
court met the problem of establishing damages for all seven hundred class members
by allowing the plaintiffs to select ten representative parcels purportedly affected and
tried the issues related to these ten parcels separately. Nestle v. Santa Monica,
6 Cal. 3d 920, 101 Cal. Rptr. 568, 496 P.2d 480 (1972).
Property owners around the Miami International Airport brought a similar class
action against the Dade County Port Authority, asking one hundred million dollars
in damages. 2 Env. Rep.-Cur. Dev. 1181 (1972).
Residents of Port Huron, Michigan, filed a class action against Peerless Cement
Company of Detroit in the Wayne County Circuit Court. The forty-seven named
plaintiffs charged Peerless with air pollution and asked for 3.18 million dollars in
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The student note writer mentioned above who contended that the

class action would be an effective device for environmental cost internalization was forced, due to the lack of precedent directly on point,
to rely to a considerable extent on the important role of the class suit
in antitrust law.48 It is important to note that such actions seek treble
damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act, 49 which offers additional

inducement to plaintiffs' lawyers interested in
also ensures a greater deterrent impact when the
courts have reached a somewhat similar result
allowing plaintiffs to recover punitive damages
damages.

a contingent fee and
class prevails. A few
in pollution cases by
in addition to actual

In McElwain v. Georgia-PacificCorporation,0 for example,

the jury found that plaintiff's property had been damaged by effluents
and noxious gases from defendant's paper mill. Defendant knew when

it built its mill that there might be damage to adjoining property, and
there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that
damages for injury to health and property. 3 Env. Rep.-Cur. Dev. 596 (1972).
Lawyers for plaintiffs in state class actions can be guilty of overreaching, however. Residents of Detroit and six surrounding communities filed a class action suit
in Wayne County Circuit Court charging twenty-four defendants (including both industrial corporations and government agencies) with air pollution. Eighty-two plaintiffs brought suit on behalf of all other residents similarly situated, alleging damages
to health and property. The plaintiffs asked for an affirmative injunction requiring
anti-pollution measures and damages totaling 250 million dollars. 3 Env. Rep.-Cur.
Dev. 361 (1972). The class suit was denied. The trial judge ruled that litigation
against all twenty-four defendants would be "unmanageable" and dismissed the action,
reserving plaintiffs' right to file separate suits against each defendant. 3 Env. Rep.Cur. Dev. 1191-92 (1973).
The Montana Supreme Court refused to overturn a trial court ruling permitting a
class action air pollution suit against two Anaconda Company plants on behalf of
fifteen hundred persons. The suit, filed in Flathead County District Court, asked for
21.5 million dollars in damages. 2 Env. Rep.-Cur. Dev. 882 (1971).
The Nevada Cement Company was ordered to pay 1.8 million dollars in damages
for what Nevada District Judge Richard Waters termed the "deliberate, wanton destruction of the property of others." There were eighty-five members of the class.
Each received five thousand dollars for property damage and an equal share of the
1.4 million dollars awarded as punitive damages. The trial judge stated that the company "knew, for every day of full operation, 27,000 pounds of dirt and dust were
being expelled over the area. Yet never once did it shut down or offer to shut
down the monstrous excretion it was spewing forth." Washington Post, Nov. 26,
1971, at A24, col. 1. The company filed an appeal in the Nevada Supreme Court
January 19, 1972. 2 Env. Rep.-Cur. Dev. 1181 (1972).
For a more general treatment of state class actions in a different but related
context, see Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 COLUm. L. Rv.
609 (1971); Starrs, The Consumer Class Action (pts. 1-2), 49 B.U.L. Rav. 211, 407
(1969); Comment, Expanding the Impact of State Court Class Action Adjudications
to Provide an Effective Forum for Consumers, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1002 (1971).
48. Cost Internalization415-18.
49. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
50. 245 Ore. 247, 421 P.2d 957 (1966).
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the defendant had not done everything reasonably possible to control
pollution and minimize the damage done to surrounding parties. Thus
the court held that there was adequate evidence for a jury to award
punitive damages.5 1 This is by no means a majority view; apparently

Oregon is the only state that allows punitive damages when the defendant did not do everything within his power to eliminate or min-

imize damages from pollution."a
An attorney's risk of non-reward in an antitrust or securities class
suit "is minimized if he can base an action on judgments or records

collected by governmental agencies that enforce antitrust and securities
laws."5 "

Environmental litigators may derive similar benefits from fed-

eral air and water pollution records and documents.54 In explaining
the citizen suit provisiona5 of the Clean Air Act of 1970, for example,

the Report of the Senate Committee on Public Works commented as
follows:
Whether abatement were sought by an agency or by a citizen,
there would be a considerable record available to the courts in any
enforcement proceeding resulting from the Federal and State administrative standard-setting procedures ...
The information and other disclosure obligations required
throughout the bill are important to the operation of this provision.
The Secretary would have a special duty to make meaningful information on emitting sources available to the public on a timely
basis. 56
When these records are compiled and made available to plaintiffs' lawyers, they may lessen the burdens of environmental litigation
51. See also Reynolds Metals Co. v. Lampert, 316 F.2d 272, 324 F.2d 465 (9th
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 910 (1964), where the court found there was enough
evidence to submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury. But see Fairview Farms,
Inc. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 176 F. Supp. 178 (D.Ore. 1959).
52. MAcDoNALD & CONwAY, supra note 1, at § 2.26. Perhaps this fact explains
the interesting series of air pollution cases against the aluminum plants in the Pacific
Northwest, which includes the cases cited in the two previous notes and also Reynolds
Metals Co. v. Wand, 308 F.2d 504 (9th Cir. 1962); Renken v. Harvey Aluminum,
Inc., 226 F. Supp. 169 (D. Ore. 1963); Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 135 F. Supp.
379 (D. Ore. 1952), aff'd sub nom. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Yturbide, 258 F.2d
321 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 840 (1958); Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co.,
221 Ore. 86, 342 P.2d 790 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 918 (1960).
53. Cost Internalization418.
54. See Miller & Borchers, Private Lawsuits and Air Pollution Control, 56 A.B.A.I.
465 (1970).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2 (1970).
56. S. REP. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1970). See also S. REP. No.
92-414, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 80-81 (1971) (describing the citizen suit provision of the
Water Pollution Control Act of 1972).

1396

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

considerably. Even with this new information, however, parties who
attempt to internalize the costs of pollution by using the class action
device face an uphill struggle. Problems such as the jurisdictional
amount requirement, standing, causation, manageability, and predominance of common questions still must be surmounted.
11.

THRESHOLD QUESTIONS

A. Federal Jurisdiction
Although not all environmental litigators seem to be aware of the
fact,17 it is clear that the class action is a procedural device that does
not broaden the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal district
courts.18 Therefore, a class suit must comply with the requirements of
the jurisdictional statute under which it is brought. For the past several years, bills have been introduced in both houses of Congress that
would broaden the concepts of standing and class actions in order to
enable citizens to sue to protect the environment without regard to the
amount in controversy. 5 Until such legislation is enacted, however,
most environmental class suits will be brought under diversity of citizenship jurisdiction6" although general federal question jurisdiction may
occasionally exist. 61 The questions that have arisen are twofold:
First. . . there is the problem of whose citizenship can or must
be considered for purposes of ascertaining whether diversity jurisdiction exists.

Second . . . courts frequently are faced with the

question whether the claims of the representative parties or of the
entire class may be aggregated in order to satisfy the amount in
controversy requirement of the applicable jurisdictional statute. 62
The first of these issues, although not yet conclusively resolved by
the Supreme Court, seems less difficult. The general rule prior to the
1966 amendments was that only the citizenship of the named parties
would be considered in determining whether complete diversity ex57. See, e.g., Pacific Inter-club Yacht Ass'n v. Morris, 197 F. Supp. 218, 223
(N.D. Cal. 1960), wherein the court stated: "Banding together a group of individuals
who could not invoke the jurisdiction of this Court does not cloak the group with
rights not granted to the several individuals."
58. FED. R. CIv. P. 82.

59. See, e.g., S. 1032, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); H.R. 49, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1972). It is significant that both these bills restricted citizens to seeking injunctive
or declaratory relief under the easier jurisdictional standards.
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).

61. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970). See generally Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406
U.S. 91, 95 (1972) (suggesting that there is a federal common law of water pollution).
62. 7 WRIGHT &MILLER § 1755, at 548.
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isted.6 3 There were some suggestions that the 1966 amendments re-

quired a different rule,64 but most courts that have considered the question have concluded that the citizenship of the named representatives
continues to be determinative. 65 A leading commentator has written:
This conclusion seems sound inasmuch as Rule 23 would be
completely unworkable in the diversity context and its value significantly compromised if the citizenship of all the members of the
class, many of whom may be unknown, had to be considered in
establishing jurisdiction. 66
Establishing diversity for the named plaintiffs may still be a prob-

lem in pollution cases, however.

The injured parties in this context

are normally going to be clustered near a major facility of the corpo-

rate defendant.

The representative parties, quite obviously, must be

members of the class suffering the harm 67 and will therefore share this
geographical proximity to the defendant. Since the 1958 amendment

to the federal diversity statute, 68 which attributed corporate citizenship
to the state of principal business activity as well as to the state of in-

corporation, the defendant will often be a citizen of the same state as
that of the class members. Nevertheless, it is likely that many national corporations are still candidates for environmental class suits in
the federal courts.69
The more difficult problem for plaintiffs in environmental class

actions is that of satisfying the jurisdictional amount requirement, as
construed by the Supreme Court in Snyder v. Harris."6 A complete
63. Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 365 (1921).
64. Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 GEo. L.J. 1204, 1219

(1966).
65. E.g., Hobbs v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 76 (E.D. Pa. 1970);
Winegar v. First Nat'1 Bank, 267 F. Supp. 79 (M.D. Fla. 1967). There is a statement
by Mr. Justice Black in Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 339-40 (1969), which indicates
that he assumes the old doctrine has not been changed by the 1966 amendments.
66. 7 VAGHT &MILLER § 1755, at 551.
67. "One or more members of a class may sue . . . as representative parties on
behalf of all only if . . . (2) the claims . . . of the representative parties are typical .... " FEn. R. Crw. P. 23(a).
68. Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, § 2, 72 Stat. 415, amending 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1970)).
69. See, e.g., Zahn v. International Paper Co., 53 F.R.D. 430 (D. Vt. 1971),
afl'd 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. granted, 93 S. Ct. 1370 (1973) (No. 72-888);
Chicago v. General Motors Corp., 332 F. Supp. 285 (N.D. Ill. 1971), af'd, 467 F.2d
1262 (7th Cir. 1972) (both based on diversity of citizenship and dismissed on other
grounds). Cf. Biechele v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 309 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ohio 1969)
(a successful class action to abate air pollution that was removed to the federal court
by the defendant under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1970)), discussed in text accompanying
notes 104-112 infra.
70. 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
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understanding of the impact of Snyder entails another brief digression
into the history of the federal class action statute. Original rule 23
divided all class suits into three categories, cast in terms of jural relationships involving a complicated balance of rights and liabilities:
"true," "hybrid," and "spurious. ' 71 The true class action was one in
which the right to be enforced was "joint, or common,"7 2 which was
normally interpreted to mean that it was one wherein the joinder of
all interested parties would be required. 78 All class suits that were not
true, the highest or most honored type, were either hybrid or spurious.
These two categories were alike in that the claims involved were "severar' 74 rather than joint or common as in the true class action. They
were distinguished in that the object of a hybrid proceeding was the
adjudication of claims that might affect the specific property involved
in the action. One court phrased it as follows:
If the rights of the individual plaintiffs are separate causes of
action and they have no right to a common fund or to common
property, the class action at bar is a "spurious" one. If, upon
the other hand, the individual plaintiffs having individual causes
fund or in common propof action have also a right to a common
75
erty, the class action may be "hybrid."
Most suits against polluters, whether equitable or in law for damages,
would have been characterized as spurious, since any of the injured
parties could sue without joining other interested parties even though
a successful defense might prejudice the rights of other potential class
members. The important lesson to be gained from the foregoing discussion is that the claims of members of a spurious class could not be
aggregated to satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement.70
71. These labels were not found in rule 23 itself but were coined by Prof. Moore,
chief architect of the original rule. See J. MooRE, 3B Moon's FEDERAL PRACrIcE
I 23.08-.11 (2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as MooRE]; Moore, Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised by the Preliminary Draft, 25 GEO. L.I. 551,
570-76 (1937).
72. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1), 308 U.S. 689 (1938).
73. 3B MooRs f 23.08.
74. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2), (3), 308 U.S, 689 (1938). It is difficult to attach
much meaning to terms such as this when such a renowned scholar as Prof. Chaffee
was moved to remark that he had as much trouble distinguishing a "common" right
from a "several" one as in deciding whether some ties were green or blue. Z. CHAFEE,
supra note 12, at 257.
75. Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. on Lives & Granting Annuities v. Deckart, 123
F.2d 979, 983 (3d Cir. 1941). "Spurious class actions . . . were in essence merely a
form of permissive joinder in which parties with separate and distinct claims were allowed to litigate those claims in a single suit simply because the different claims involved common questions of law or fact." Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 335 (1969).
76. Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939); Pinel v. Pinel, 240 U.S. 594
(1916); 7 WurGHT & MuLuR § 1756.
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In 1966 the statute was completely rewritten, the framers having
concluded that "[i]n practice, the terms 'joint,' 'common,' etc., which
were used as the basis of the Rule 23 classification, proved obscure
and uncertain. '7' Revised rule 23 "substitutes functional tests for the

conceptualisms that characterized practice under the former rule."78
Superficially resembling the old rule in that the class must qualify
under one of the three headings of amended rule 23(b), the three general categories are now based on the nature of the relief sought rather
than the jural relationships of the parties. 79 Because the new rule omits

the reference to joint or common interests found in the original version
of the rule and because the framers of the revised rule specifically
repudicated the old scheme, there was a brief period of uncertainty
regarding the non-aggregation doctrine.
Some courts held that
amended rule 23 had not changed the principle that separate and dis-

tinct claims, such as ecologists normally bring, could not be aggregated
in class actions to satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement.80

Other courts,' as well as the draftsmen of new rule 2382 and various
commentators,

3

thought that the amended rule had the effect of re-

defining amount in controversy for class action purposes and therefore concluded that aggregation was possible in those actions that
would formerly have been termed "spurious."

The Supreme Court dashed these latter expectations when it resolved the controversy with Snyder v. Harris"4 in 1969.

The Court

77. Advisory Committee Note 98; see Kaplan, supra note 14.
78. 7 WRiGHT & MiLLER § 1753, at 538.
79. These new groupings were not intended to be coterminous with the three
categories of old rule 23. 7 WRIGHT & MILLER § 1752, at 514-15.
80. Alvarez v. Pan. Am. Life Ins. Co., 375 F.2d 992 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 827 (1967); Hartman v. Secretary of Dep't of HUD, 294 F. Supp. 794 (E.D.
Mass. 1968); Lesch v. Chicago & E. Ill. R.R., 279 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Ill. 1968);
Neville v. Delta Ins. Co., 45 F.R.D. 345 (D. Minn. 1968); Pomierski v. W. R. Grace
Co., 282 F. Supp. 385 (N.D. Ill. 1967); Dixon v. Northwestern Natl Bank, 276 F.
Supp. 96, 99 (D. Minn. 1967).
81. Gas Serv. Co. v. Coburn, 389 F.2d 831 (10th Cir. 1968), rev'd, 394 U.S. 332
(1969); Snyder v. Epstein, 290 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. Wis. 1968); Collins v. Bolton, 287
F. Supp. 393 (N.D. IM. 1968); Booth v. General Dynamics Corp., 264 F. Supp. 465
(N.D. Ill. 1967).
82. Advisory Committee Note 104; Kaplan, supra note 14, at 400; Kaplan, A
Prefatory Note, in The Class Action-A Symposium, 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. Rlv. 497

(1969).

83. See, e.g., Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 GEo. L.J.
1204, 1221 (1966); Dole, Consumer Class Actions Under Recent Consumer Credit
Legislation, 44 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 80, 110 (1969); Ford, Federal Rule 23: A Device for
Aiding the Small Claimant, 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 501, 504 (1969).
84. 394 U.S. 332.
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breathed new life into the discarded categories of the old rule s5 by

adopting the pre-1966 standard, holding that claim aggregation will be
allowed only in those suits involving multiple plaintiffs who are en-

forcing a single right in which they have a common interest-i.e.,
"true" class actions.

It is not within the scope of this comment to

analyse the merits of Snyder;86 suffice it to say that it is now the controlling authority. For the environmental lawyer, the decision means
that resort to rule 23 will not be possible in most situations.

Class

actions for pollution damages will generally not meet the standard of
Snyder because each member of the class will have suffered a separate
wrong and fairly small individual damage amount will be at issue.8?
The effect of the decision, therefore, may be to restrict litigants to
whatever relief is available in the state courts.
Although the Court in Snyder reasoned that denying the plaintiffs a federal forum was justified since such diversity cases only in-

volve issues of state law,88 it did not consider the practical fact that
the state remedies are of limited utility.

Plaintiffs attempting to se-

cure relief for pollution-related injuries may not be able to secure effective relief in state courts, particularly if the local procedural system
discourages class suits.8 9
For this reason it is important that environmental litigators note
that the limitations of the Snyder decision may still be circumvented
85. Although the Court stated that the discarded "spurious" and "true" categories
were never and are not now the reason for not allowing aggregation of separate and
distinct claims, since the non-aggregation "doctrine is based . . .upon this Court's
interpretation of the statutory phrase 'matter in controversy,'" id. at 336, it is quite
clear that Snyder forces the district courts to determine whether the interests involved
are "joint" or "several" for jurisdictional purposes, "an inquiry that not only frequently
is quite difficult but one that supposedly the amended rule is designed to avoid."
7 WRIGHT & MILLER § 1756, at 561.
86. "Despite the strong arguments advanced by the Court, the soundness of the
Snyder decision is dubious." 7 WRIGHT & MILLER § 1756, at 558. As this remark
indicates, the decision has been frequently and vigorously criticized. See, e.g., Nd.,
at 558-65; Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, supra note 82, at 498; Strausberg, Class Actions
and Jurisdictional Amount: Access to a Federal Forum-A Post Snyder v. Harris
Analysis, 22 AM. U.L. REv. 79 (1972); Note, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83
HAv. L. REv. 202 (1970); Note, Taxpayer Suits and The Aggregation of Claims:
The Vitiation of Flast by Snyder, 79 YALE UJ. 1577 (1970). But see, Maraist &
Sharp, After Snyder v. Harris: Whither Goes the Spurious Class Action? 41 MIss.
L.J 379 (1970).
87. See Lamm & Davison, supra note 1, at 87-88. See also C. WRIGHT, FEDEMAL
COURIS § 72, at 316 (2d ed. 1970).
88. "Suits involving issues of state law and brought on the basis of diversity of
citizenship can often be most appropriately tried in state court." 394 U.S. at 341.
89. For further discussion of state class actions, see text accompanying note 47
infra.
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in several ways. First, many federal statutes provide a special jurisdictional basis without regard to the amount in controversy 0 Specific legislation that would allow class actions by citizens to protect
the environment has at least been proposed, although most of the bills
limit the remedies available to declaratory or injunctive relief.9 1 Secondly, as a result of the ambiguity of the old categories, a court interested in seeing the class action continue because a "common element"
so predominates might label an essentially "spurious" action "true." 92
Thirdly, some courts have allowed plaintiffs to meet the jurisdictional
amount requirement by measuring the matter in controversy from the
point of view of the defendant rather than the plaintiffs.9" This "defendant's view" doctrine is particularly appropriate when the class is
seeking equitable relief that, if granted, might force the defendant to
shut down a multi-million dollar factory or to install very expensive
anti-pollution equipment. Fourthly, a recent Supreme Court decision
indicated that the courts should liberally evaluate environmental rights
when it concluded: "The considerable interests involved in the purity
of interstate waters would seem to put beyond question the jurisdictional amount provided in § 1331(a)." 94 Again, this is an attitude
that will likely be restricted to suits for injunctive or declaratory relief,
and will thus be of small comfort to litigators seeking damages for
pollution.
Fifthly, Professors Wright and Miller9 5 see great promise in the
approach taken by the Second Circuit in West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer
& Co.,9" where the court indicated that the limitations of Snyder might
be circumvented in some situations by allowing the state to bring an
90. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(a)(1) (1970) (Clean Air Act Amendments);
33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1973 Supp.) (Water Pollution Control Act); 28 U.S.C. § 1337
(interstate commerce and antitrust matters) and § 1343 (civil rights) (1970).
91. See text accompanying note 59 supra.
92. E.g., Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Coker, 219 F.2d 631 (4th Cir. 1955);
Dixon v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 276 F. Supp. 96 (D. Minn. 1967).
93. Mississippi & Mo. R.R. v. Ward, 67 U.S. 485 (1862); Ronzio v. Denver &
Rio Grand W.R.R., 116 F.2d 604 (10th Cir. 1940); Chicago v. General Motors Corp.,
332 F. Supp. 285 (N.D. Ill. 1971), aff'd 467 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1972) (alternative
holding); Biechele v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 309 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ohio 1969) (alternative
holding). See Strausberg, supra note 86, at 102-07, wherein the author suggests this
approach as the principal way to mitigate the impact of Snyder, particularly in all
federal question cases.
94. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 98 (1972); accord, Chicago v.
General Motors Corp., 332 F. Supp. 285 (N.D. Ill. 1971), aff'd, 467 F.2d 1262 (7th
Cir. 1972) (alternative holding); Biechele v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 309 F. Supp. 354
(N.D. Ohio 1969) (alternative holding).
95. 7A WRIGHT & MULLER § 1782, at 105-09.
96. 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
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action on behalf of its citizens. In this private antitrust action brought
under rule 23 by several states against a manufacturer of antibiotic
drugs, the court said that recovery by the states could be justified under
two theories. The first was institution of the suit as parens patriae.97
Use of this doctrine is limited, however, to cases in which the state has
an interest independent of its citizens.9 8 In the Pfizer case the state
itself had purchased antibiotics from the defendant and was thus able
to meet this requirement; had the state lacked this independent claim
for more than ten thousand dollars, it could not have used parens patriae to sue solely on behalf of its injured citizens. As was stated by
another court in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.:
[Ihe state's parens patriae claim cannot be a disguised attempt
to recover damages on behalf of the state's individual citizenclaimants. It is not a substitute for a class action under Rule
23 . . .. 99
The Pfizer court actually relied upon a second theory, that the state
was bringing a traditional rule 23 class action on behalf of its citizens. 100
In its discussion of the adequacy of the notice sent to the class members, the court seemed to be characterizing the situation as one

in which the citizens had assigned their claims to the state. Citizens having small claims for environmental injury could thus circumvent the Snyder decision by transferring their claims to the state attorney general; although this would prevent personal recovery by the citizens, it would serve the more important social goals of cost internalization and deterrence. 101 In light of the Supreme Court's decision in
Kramer v. Caribbean Mills, Inc.,102 however, there is a serious question as to the validity of assignments to create federal jurisdiction. Although Kramer can be distinguished from the assignment of damages
claims in the environmental context, 03 the environmental litigator
97. Id., at 1089. See generally Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439
(1945); Note, State Protection of Its Economy and Environment: Parens Patrlae Suits
for Damages, 6 COLO. J. OF LAw & Soc. PaoB. 411 (1970); Comment, Wrongs Without
Remedy: The Concept of Parens PatriaeSuits for Treble Damages Under the Antitrust
Laws, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 570 (1970).
98. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1944).

99. 301 F. Supp. 982, 986 (D. Haw. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 431 F.2d 1282

(9th Cir. 1970), aff'd, 405 U.S. 251 (1972); accord, In re Motor Vehicle Air Pollution
Control Equipment, 52 F.R.D. 398, 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970). For comments on the

Hawaii cases by counsel for the plaintiffs, see Blecher, supra note 23.
100. 440 F.2d at 1089.
101. See text accompanying notes 35-56 supra.

102. 394 U.S. 823 (1969).

103. Cf. 7A WRIGHT & MILLER § 1782, at 109.
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should be aware that he must tread cautiously when urging upon a
court the Pfizer approach.
A sixth possible means of avoiding the limitations of Snyder was
suggested by Biechele v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 10 one of the few
successful federal class actions in the environmental context. Ironically enough, the action was filed in a state court and removed' 015
to the federal district court by the defendant on the ground of diversity
of citizenship. The plaintiffs' class action sought damages and injunctive relief to abate the air pollution created by the railroad's coal storage
and shipping facilities. The court kept the possibility of monetary
damages open, even after acknowledging that Snyder would not permit
aggregation of these claims for less than ten thousand dollars each, by
holding that "there are two separate and distinct class actions involved."' 00 The court described the claim for injunctive relief as the
"first and principal action,"' 0 7 and was able to find the requisite jurisdictional amount for this action on two of the theories suggested above:
a liberal evaluation of the right to live in a clean environment, 0 8 and
the defendant's viewpoint: 09
It appears to the Court that the right of each member of the class
to live in an environment free from excessive coal dust and conversely, the right of defendant to operate its coal loading facility
are both in excess of $10,000.00.110
Having established the jurisdictional basis for the injunctive action,
the court turned to the second action-that for damages. This action,
by itself, could not have been heard in a federal court, because without
aggregation the plaintiffs could not have met the jurisdictional amount
requirement. But since the same evidence would be presented for
the damage claims as for the equitable claim already properly before
the court, the district judge concluded that "this Court, in the interest
of judicial efficiency, will assume jurisdiction over the entire controversy.'
Although the result is both logically sound and emotionally satisfying to environmental lawyers starved for success in class actions for
104. 309 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ohio 1969).
105. Jurisdiction was therefore based on 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970), as well as the
general diversity provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970). 309 F. Supp. at 354-55.
106. 309 F. Supp. at 355.
107. Id.
108. See text and cases cited at note 94 supra.
109. See text and authorities cited at note 93 supra.
110. 309 F. Supp. at 355.
111. Id.
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damages, the precedential value of Biechele is indeterminate due to the
peculiar factual setting of the case. The court was not working with
the basic jurisdictional provisions, but with the removal statute, which
states:
Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action, which would be removable if sued upon alone, is joined
with one or more otherwise non-removable claims or causes of
action, the entire case may be removed and the district court may
determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all
matters not otherwise within its original jurisdiction.11 2
The procedural context of Biechele provided a perfect opportunity for a
sympathetic judge to consider both the damage claim and the equitable
claim on the basis of this statute, but most environmental litigation
will not begin in a state court only to be removed subsequently to federal court and consequently will not be susceptible to the Biechele approach.
The narrow holding of Biechele may be of limited utility, but the
rationale underlying that decision has more general applicability insofar as it supports a district court's exercise of ancillary jurisdiction in
a similar factual setting. As Professor Wright has written:
By this concept it is held that a district court acquires jurisdiction
of a case or controversy as an entirety, and may, as an incident
to disposition of a matter properly before it, possess jurisdiction
to decide other matters raised by the case of which it could not
take cognizance were they independently presented."18
Thus a court might assume jurisdiction over a claim for injunctive relief, jurisdictional amount presenting lesser problems in such cases, and
then exercise its ancillary jurisdiction to hear a claim for damages arising out of the same facts, regardless of the amount in controversy of
that latter action."14 If this looks promising to the environmental litigator, he should be aware that it seems almost too easy a way to
112. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1970).
113. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 9, at 19 (2d ed. 1970).
114. See John B. Kelly, Inc. v. Lehigh Nay. Coal Co., 151 F.2d 743 (3d Cir.
1945), an action based on nuisance and continuing trespass for alleged siltation of a
river by the defendant's coal mines, where the court concluded:
mhe money damage allegations of the bill are merely a collateral item which
the District Court can pass upon provided it possessed jurisdiction of the all
important injunctive feature of the litigation.
Id. at 746. See generally Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593 (1926);
1 W. BARoN & A. HOLTzoFF, FEDERAL PRACTIcE AND PROCEDURE § 23 (C. Wright ed.
1960); Fraser, Ancillary Jurisdiction and the Joinder of Claims in the Federal Courts,
33 F.R.D. 27 (1963); Comment, Ancillary Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 48 IowA
L. REv. 383 (1963).
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clamber over the restrictions of Snyder. Nevertheless, at least the
Biechele court would apparently sanction this approach in pollution
control cases.
The final option that may be available to keep a class suit alive
when each member of the class cannot validly allege a damage claim
of over ten thousand dollars is also based on the ancillary jurisdiction
concept. If at least one of the named representatives meets the jurisdictional amount and otherwise establishes either federal question or
diversity jurisdiction, a district court might hear the entire case and
adjudicate the ancillary claims of the other class members who have
no independent jurisdictional grounds. 115 This view was accepted by
the court in Lesch v. Chicago & EasternIllinois R.R.," 6 when it said:
[I]n a spurious class action, if one of the representative parties
has a claim in excess of the jurisdictional minimum, then federal
jurisdiction attaches, and if that party alone can adequately represent the entire class, then there is federal jurisdiction over the
entire class action even where members
of the class having smaller
17
claims are originally named parties. 1
This holding "seems sound and is a natural corollary to other applications of the ancillary jurisdiction concept.""' 8 In the fifty years since
the Supreme Court's decision in Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange,"9 the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction has evolved from a tool
used only when necessary for the effective operation of the federal
courts 120 into a "rule of convenience for resolving all issues involved
in the subject of the matter before the Court."''
This development
was especially stimulated by the enactment of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in 1938 with their provisions for liberal joinder of
parties and claims. The rules broadened the traditional concept of a
single triable "case or controversy" by allowing all parties and claims
related to the main action to be joined in one case.' 22 Courts found
the ancillary jurisdiction doctrine helpful in putting to use some of the
115. See generally 7 WRIGHT & MILLER §§ 1659 and 1756, 7A WRIGHT & MILLER
§ 1917.
116. 279 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
117. Id. at 912.
118. 7 WRIGHT & MILLER § 1756, at 564.
119. 270 U.S. 593 (1926) (ancillary jurisdiction employed to avoid piecemeal
litigation).
120. See, e.g., Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921); Freeman
v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1861).
121. Note, Federal Practice: Jurisdictionof Third-Party Claims, 11 OKLA. L. REV.
326, 329 (1958); see, e.g., Hunr v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
122. Brandt v. Olson, 179 F. Supp. 363, 370 (N.D. Iowa 1959).
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new joinder devices, particularly rules 14, 20 and 24, in that it solved

jurisdictional problems, such as amount in controversy or lack of complete diversity, which were often attendant upon joinder. 28
Sound as application of the ancillary doctrine concept in this context might seem, three courts of appeals have rejected the approach
and held that all members of the class must present a jurisdictionally proper claim. One 1 24 of these decisions was rendered before Synder; the other two, Zahn v. International Paper Co. 125 and City of
Inglewood v. City of Los Angeles, 1 26 were environmental lawsuits decided after Snyder.

Although the Zahn court explained that it felt "precluded" by Snyder from taking jurisdiction over those members of the class who did
not meet the jurisdictional amount requirement, 127 it is important to
note that Snyder did not deal directly with this issue since none of the
representatives in that case asserted a claim for more than ten thousand

dollars. 28 In Zahn, on the other hand, at least the four named representatives had a valid claim that met the amount in controversy requirement, and it appears that some other members of the proposed
class could have recovered that amount. 129 The factual distinction is

of more than passing interest inasmuch as one of the principal considerations that moved the Court to affirm the non-aggregation doctrine in
Snyder was a felt need to reduce the "burdens of an already overloaded
federal court system."'' 0 If Snyder had allowed aggregation when
none of the class members could individually have come into the fed123. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Atlantic City Hosp., 392 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1968)
(simple joinder of parties); Formulabs, Inc. v. Hartley Pen Co., 318 F.2d 485 (9th
Cir. 1963) (intervention as of right); Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1959)
(impleader of third party defendant). But see Hymer v. Chai, 407 F.2d 136 (9th
Cir. 1969) (simple joinder of parties). See generally Fraser, supra note 114.
124. Alvarez v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 375 F.2d 992 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389

U.S. 827 (1967).

125. 53 F.R.D. 430 (D. Vt. 1971), affd, 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
granted, 93 S. Ct. 1370 (1973). See text accompanying notes 4-10 supra.
126. 451 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1971).
127. 53 F.R.D. at 431-32.
128. 394 U.S. at 333-34. The dissenters in Snyder, however, thought that the rule
there announced would apply "in all cases where one or more of the co-plaintiffs have
a claim of less than the jurisdictional amount . . .' Id. at 343 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
129. This supposition is supported by the fact that the defendant contended that
"many members of the proposed class fail to meet the jurisdictional amount. .. ."
(53 F.R.D. at 431) (emphasis added) as well as by the court's discussion of the
possibility of a class defined as all plaintiffs in the named class having $10,000 in
controversy. 53 F.R.D. at 433.
130. 394 U.S. at 341.

1973]

ENVIRONMENTAL CLASS ACTION

1407

eral courts, it would have provided a means for plaintiffs to circumvent the jurisdictional requirement and perhaps have appreciably increased the federal courts' case load. Conversely, in Zahn the four
named representatives and all other plaintiffs who can allege the jurisdictional amount must be allowed to go to trial in the federal district

court. Their former fellow class members must duplicate all of the
evidence in the state court. The Zahn extension of Snyder is thus unnecessary and irrational. It does not lessen the burdens on the federal

judiciary, but it does promote expensive and time-consuming duplicative litigation in the state courts.:31
Like the earlier controversy over aggregation that precipitated the
Snyder decision, this issue will soon be resolved by the Supreme
Court.13 2 If the Court affirms Zahn, it will have effectively eliminated

the rule 23(b)(3) class action for damages for pollution-related injuries." 3

Whether the Court affirms or reverses Zahn, the decision will

be an important clue as to the role federal courts will play in the struggle to redress environmental despoilation.'" 4

B.

Standing to Sue
Whereas the jurisdictional amount requirement is more often a
problem faced by the class seeking damages for pollution, standing is
a requirement that falls most heavily on the organizational plaintiff
asking for equitable or declaratory relief in a "public" lawsuit.'3 5 The
distinction between public and private causes of action" 6 is central
131. 469 F.2d at 1039 (Timbers, J., dissenting); see Note, Class Actions, 9
HousroN L. REv. 852, 857 (1972).
132. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Zahn case February 20, 1973.
93 S. Ct. 1370.
133. Such a decision would mean that the class suit "cannot be used in diversity
cases save for the extraordinary situation in which every member of the class has a
claim in excess of $10,000. . . ." WRiGHT § 72, at 316 (emphasis added). See Zahn,
53 F.R.D. at 433, where the court concluded:
We reach our decision today with great reluctance. . . . The requirement
that each class member meet the jurisdictional amount clearly undermines the
usefulness of Rule 23(b) (3) class suits, because the problem of defining an
appropriate class over which the court has jurisdiction will often prove insuperable.
134. Most of the Court's decisions in the environmental sphere have involved
claims for injunctions or declaratory judgments. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727 (1972); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972). Zahn may be
the first suit for damages in this area to reach the Supreme Court.
135. "The law of standing is almost exclusively concerned with such public law
questions as determinations of constitutionality and review of administrative or other
governmental action." WRIGHT § 13, at 39.
136. See generally W. PEossER, HANDBOOK OF T

LAw OF TORTS 583-602 (4th

ed. 1971); Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 601 (1968);
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to the concept of standing. Certainly "private" plaintiffs suing a polluter for monetary damages must establish their standing to sue, but
normally such standing is self-evident. Generally, a private suit is the

assertion of "a distinctive or discriminating impact which specially entitles [a litigant] to challenge an allegedly illegal . . . action."' 13 7
Thus private citizens will have little trouble establishing standing when
they can show that pollution threatens or actually causes economic
loss or damage to their health.' 8s

On the other hand, actions brought by organizations such as the
Sierra Club or the Environmental Defense Fund are "public" in the

sense that they seek to vindicate broad social concerns rather than individual interests. 139 These public suits ordinarily lie against government officials, although a private defendant may be involved, and seek
equitable relief.

The objective is more often conservation rather than

the control or prevention of pollution. 140
been more troublesome in such cases.

Traditionally, standing has

Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohifeldian or Ideological
Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1033 (1968); Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review:
Public Actions, 74 HIv.L. REv. 1265 (1961); Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75 HtAv. L. REv. 255 (1961). The latter two articles, in
revised form, constitute chapters 12 and 13 in L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADmiIsTRATIVE ACTION (1965).
137. L. JAFFE, JUmcAL CONTROL, supra note 136 at 501. Almost any injury
suffered has been found sufficient for standing. For example, the courts have given
standing to the following plaintiffs: young mothers who asserted that the government's rejection of a plan of zero tolerance for DDT made their own milk less safe
and, consequently, they could not breast feed their babies, Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. HEW, 428 F.2d 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1970); students who asserted that a
proposed highway through their campus would affect their status as pedestrians by
destroying trees and increasing traffic and noise, Nolop v. Volpe, 333 F. Supp. 1364
(D.S.D. 1971); persons who regularly engaged in canoeing and other recreational activities in an affected waterway, Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1971); a
plaintiff who regularly visited his father's property, which was near the site of a
radioactive project, Crowther v. Seaborg, 312 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Colo. 1970); and a
tour guide who regularly conducted parties through an endangered forest area, Parker
v. U.S., 307 F. Supp. 685 (D. Colo. 1969).
138. When faced with a class suit against a major local polluter, a court will
sometimes state that the group lacks standing to sue because the harm it is suffering
in the form of fouled air, for example, is not distinguishable from the harm suffered
generally by the public. Of course, scientists could prove that the air is not uniformly
polluted, but some courts would dismiss the suit on the pleadings and never allow the
proof to come in. Although the decision is often framed in terms of a lack of
"standing", it is more properly seen as a manifestation of the troublesome distinction
between public and private nuisance. See generally Prosser, Private Actions for
Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REv. 997 (1966); Note, Air Pollution as a Private
Nuisance, 24 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 314 (1967).
139. See Jaffe, Standing to Secure JudicialReview, supra note 136.
140. See, e.g., Parker v. United States, 448 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 989 (1972) (Forest Service may not permit logging in areas being
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An offspring of the "case or controversy" requirement of the Constitution, 141 standing is simply a judicial tool to insure that the plaintiff
is a proper party to bring a particular legal action. This is obviously
a difficult determination to make when a plaintiff purports to represent
the public interest because many parties might desire to slip into that
role even though they lack the ability to play it well. Fearing a multiplicity of suits, the federal courts attempted to screen out collusive
suits and nominal presentations by requiring potential plaintiffs to
demonstrate a "personal stake"' 42 or a "legal wrong.' 43 These standards demand more than the common meaning of the words might indicate; not even an economic interest was sufficient' 4 4 and it was certainly insufficient to base one's interest on aesthetic or conservation
grounds. The basic guidelines were clearly summarized in Associated
14 5
Industries of New York v. Ickes:
[I]n a suit in a federal court by a citizen against a government
officer, complaining of alleged past or threatened future unlawful
conduct by the defendant, there is no justiciable "controversy"
. . . unless the citizen shows that such conduct or threatened conduct invades or will invade a private substantive legally protected
interest of the plaintiff citizen; such invaded interest must be either
of a "recognized" character, at "common law" or a substantive
private legally protected interest created by statute. 146
The last five years, though, have witnessed a dramatic liberalization of the standing doctrines insofar as they apply to the organizational plaintiff bringing a public action to protect the environment.
This shift began with Flast v. Cohen 47 when the Supreme Court suggested that a "legally protected interest" would not always be a prerequisite for standing:
considered for wilderness designation); Buch v. Morton, 449 F.2d 600 (9th Cir. 1971)
(California may not open public domain lands to entry or location under federal
mining laws); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972) (suit under Federal Power Act to challenge
siting of power plant); Harrison Coalition v. Volpe, 330 F. Supp. 918 (M.D. Pa.
1971) (action under the Federal-Aid Highway Act to block construction of highway
through public park).
141. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
142. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968).
143. Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 450 (1970).
See generally, Juergensmeyer, supranote 39.
144. Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939).
145. 134 F.2d 694, 700-01 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943); see
Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
146. 134 F.2d at 700.
147. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
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Thus, in terms of Article III limitations on federal court jurisdiction, the question of standing is related only to whether the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary
context and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial
resolution. 148
The new trend was clarified in Association of Data Processing
Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp'49 and Barlow v. Collins,81 0 in
which the court announced a new two-part standing test. The first
element, arising out of the constitutional case or controversy requirement, requires the plaintiff to allege that the challenged injury has
caused him "injury in fact, economic or otherwise."'' 1 Secondly, the
court specifically considered and rejected the traditional "legal interest"
standard, because that issue goes to the merits. 1 2 Instead, a trial court
must ask "whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question."'r 8 In a
significant aside, the court added that this interest might at times "reflect 'aesthetic, conservational and recreational' as well as economic
values."'

4

Further guidance as to the nature of the non-economic interests
that would suffice to establish standing came in a recent public interest lawsuit, Sierra Club v. Morton." 5 The court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing, holding that a plaintiff "seeking review must
allege facts showing that he is himself adversely affected" by the con56
duct at issue.'
The Sierra Club failed to allege that it or its members would be
affected in any of their activities or pastimes by the Disney development. Nowhere in the pleadings or affidavits did the Club
state that its members use Mineral King for any purpose, much
less that they use it in any way that would be significantly affected
by the proposed actions of the respondents. 1 57
148. Id. at 101.

149. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
150. 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
151. 397 U.S. at 152.
152. Id. at 153.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 154.

155. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
156. Id. at 740.

157. Id. at 735. See Sierra Club v. Mason, 351 F. Supp. 419 (D. Conn. 1972),
where the court quoted this statement and then opined: "Implicit in this statement is
the conclusion that such allegations as to the [Sierra] Club's members would have been
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Noting only the result and not the language of the court, some

commentators foresaw the death of the public lawsuit by organizational plaintiffs and turned to the class action device as a possible
substitute.1 5 This epitaph seems premature in light of the first group
of lower court decisions applying the Sierra Club guidelines.'5 9 Organizational plaintiffs have been allowed to establish standing in these

cases by alleging that some of the club members use the affected area
for recreation. It is difficult to imagine a significant threat to the environment which will not impinge upon the recreational activities of at
least a few members of the Sierra Club, to name but one major environmental organization.

In retrospect, it is now clear that Sierra Club

gave environmental litigators much more than it took away. The court
emphasized two important points: first, that "aesthetic, conservational,
and recreational" interests may properly be urged as a basis for standing, 6 and, secondly, that once standing has been established, the
plaintiff "may argue the public interest in support of his claim that

the agency has failed to comply with its statutory mandate."' 6

This

development should be of value both to the organizational plaintiff and

to representative parties in a class suit brought to stop environmental
despoilation.
sufficient to afford the Club standing in the action." Id. at 423. See also note 159
infra.
158. Comment, The Viability of Class Actions in Environmental Litigation, 2
ECOL. L.Q. 533, 563-64 (1972).
159. E.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 468 F.2d 1164, 1171-72 (6th
Cir. 1972) (in a suit to enjoin construction of a dam, two organizational plaintiffs
established standing by alleging that "many of their members have used the Little
Tennessee for various purposes and wish to preserve the river to protect its fish,
wildlife, surroundings, and water quality."); Sierra Club v. Mason, 351 F. Supp. 419,
422-24 (D. Conn. 1972) (in a suit to enjoin harbor dredging, organizational plaintiffs
established standing by alleging that many club members "used the area . . . for
various recreational activities, including hiking, photographing, fishing, sailing and
swimming. .. ."); Citizens for Clean Air, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 349 F. Supp.
696, 704-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (in a suit to enjoin issuance of a construction permit for a
power plant, the court inferred a threat to the health of the organizational plaintiffs'
members from the "bare-boned" allegations of residence near the proposed site and
"dangers to the quality of air" and therefore denied a motion to dismiss for lack of
standing, on the condition that the plaintiffs amend the complaint to make explicit
what was implicit in the original pleadings).
Even Sierra Club v. Morton was resurrected on remand, when a trial judge allowed the plaintiff to amend the complaint to make further allegations concerning
standing and to add additional parties. 348 F. Supp. 219, 220 (N.D. Cal. 1972). Thus
the Supreme Court's decision was something less than the "death blow" for organizational suits brought to protect the environment.
160. 405 U.S. at 734, 738.
161. Id. at 737.
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Ill.

PROCEEDING UNDER FEDERAL RULE

23

Despite the proliferation of environmental litigation in the past
few years, the class action has rarely been the procedural device that
the successful environmental plaintiff has utilized.'1 2 Several reasons
for the disutility of the class action have already been discussed; 08°
even if the class action plaintiff is able to surmount the jurisdictional
hurdles, he still must make his way through the procedural pitfalls of
rule 23. Behind the procedural difficulties, which will be examined at
length hereafter, lie two more basic reasons for the failure of environmental class actions.
The first reason, noted by numerous commentators of late, has
been the tendency of the plaintiff's reach to exceed his grasp in environmental class actions. The most notorious example to date was a
suit by two plaintiffs seeking to represent 125 million persons and
seeking damages for air pollution totaling 375 trillion dollars.'6 4 Commenting upon this case, one recent writer concluded:
Because of the plaintiff's failure to place realistic limits on the
size of the class and the claim, this court may well have been
permanently innoculated against all environmental class actions.
If so, the judge is scarcely to blame.' 65
Evident as the danger of over-ambitious litigants may be, there
is another side to the coin. While there are numerous examples of unrealistic claims, there are also instances in which courts have been
unwilling to experiment when plaintiffs with valid, albeit small, claims
have no foreseeable method of relief except by means of the class action. Courts frequently recite the litany that rule 23 is to be given
a liberal rather than a restrictive interpretation, and that a primary
function of the rule is to provide a "device for vindicating claims which
taken individually are too small to justify legal action."1 6 In practice
though, courts seem to vary widely in their attitudes towards use of the
162. Notable exceptions are Izaak Walton League v. Macchia, 329 F. Supp. 504
(D.N.J. 1971); In re Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equip., 52 F.R.D. 398
(C.D. Cal. 1970); Biechele v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 309 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ohio 1969).
163. See discussion of standing in text accompanying notes 135-61 supra, and of
jurisdictional amount in text accompanying notes 70-134 supra.
164. Heart Disease Research Foundation v. General Motors Corp., 3 E.R.C. 1710
(S.D.N.Y. 1972). The trial judge, in dismissing on the merits, noted that "plaintiffs
and their counsel have failed to realize that the damages sought are some 300 times
more than the gross national product of the United States." Id. at 1711.
165. Comment, 3 ECOL. L.Q. supra note 1, at 537. See also Lamm & Davison,
supra note 1, at 69-70.
166. Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731, 733 (2d Cir. 1965).
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class action device in environmental suits. 117 As one practitioner has
recently said, 'When the class becomes immense, the issue seems to be

resolved primarily by whether the court is convinced that the defendant
needs punishing or not."'8 s This pragmatic approach to rule 23 is understandable when the scope of discretion that the trial judge possesses

under rule 23 is fully understood.

What is said below about the re-

quirements of rule 23 in environmental litigation must be taken in the

light of the litigant's restraint (or lack of it) and the attitude of the
particular court called upon to make the determination as to whether
a class action should be maintained.
A.

Requirements of Rule 23(a)

The burden of proof on the issue of whether a class action can
be maintained is on the party who seeks to establish his right to pursue
the class action device.' 6 9 To fulfill that burden, the would-be class

representative must plead the existence of the four factors set out in
rule 23(a) and demonstrate that the action meets the criteria of one

of the three categories of class action enumerated in rule 23(b). 70
167. Compare Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972),
cert. granted, 93 S. Ct. 1370 (1973) (No. 72-888) with In re Motor Vehicle Air
Pollution Control Equip., 52 F.R.D. 398 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
168. Fitzgerald, When Is a Class a Class, 28 Bus. Lw. 95, 99 (1972).
169. Poindexter v. Teubert, 462 F.2d 1096, 1097 (4th Cir. 1972); Demarco v.
Edens, 390 F.2d 836, 845 (2d Cir. 1968).
170. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b) read as follows:
(a) Prerequisitesto a Class Action. One or more members of a class may
sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class
is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are
questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of
the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class,
and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class
action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members
of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual
members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct
for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their
ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive
relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole;
or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for
the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent
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The scope of the rule 23(a) prerequisites is not fully revealed by
a reading of the rule itself. At least two additional prerequisites have
been required by courts before allowing a class action to proceed. First
is the obviously essential necessity that an ascertainable class exist;

second is the requirement that the would-be representative be a member of that class. Both of these implied requirements present problems for the class representative in environmental suits in addition to
the stated prerequisites of rule 23(a).

1. Ascertainability
The definition of the class has become a crucial issue under the

amended rule 23 since a judgment is now binding upon all class members.' 7 1 Although it is clear that there must be a "class," it is not
clear how well-defined that class must be. One need not know exactly
how many persons are in the class, nor must every class member be
individually identified. 172 But the boundaries of the class must be
drawn with "some precision '17 3 so that "it is administratively feasible
for the court to determine whether a particular individual is a member.' 74 For example, a class of "all Texas citizens who are for the
orderly development of Texas Parks and Recreational Facilities in accordance with the State Comprehensive Outdoor Recreation Plan" was
held not adequately defined to identify an ascertainable class of per-

sons.' 7 5 The court determined that it was impossible to delineate into the findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually
controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and
nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by
or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
171. Prior to 1966 the court's judgment in "true" and "hybrid" class actions was
binding upon all the members of the class, whether or not represented. But judgment
in "spurious" class actions purported to bind only those class members actually present
and represented. Subsection (b)(3) of the new rule 23, though somewhat analogous
to the "spurious" class action, was given a binding effect on all persons who (1) are
found to be members of the class, and (2) do not "opt-out" by way of rule 23(c) (2).
The problem of defining who is a class member and who is not assumes considerable
importance not only with regard to a later challenge of the judgment by an unrepresented party who claims not to be a member of the class but also as to the problem
of giving adequate notice to the unnamed class members via rule 23(c)(2) for purposes of fulfilling the requirements of due process.
172. Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 492 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd on other
grounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1970).
173. Fischer v. Kletz, 41 F.R.D. 377, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
174. 7 WRIGHT & MILLER § 1760, at 581.
175. Johnson v. Russell, 3 E.R.C. 1523, 1525 (W.D. Tex. 1971), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Johnson v. Morton, 456 F.2d 68 (5th Cir. 1972).
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dividually those persons who were "for orderly development" other than
through polling every person in the state as to his opinion. 176 Ideological
delineation would thus seem to be impossible; a class cannot be formed
according to common ideas, beliefs or opinions.
Geographical and institutional delineation has been more successful. In Biechele v. Norfolk & Western Ry.,1' 7 discussed earlier with
regard to the jurisdictional amount issuer plaintiffs alleged that coal
dust was blowing off defendant's storage piles and accumulating on
their houses and furniture. The court itself undertook the task of delineating the geographical boundaries of the class. Evidence taken
during a hearing for a temporary restraining order as to the extent and
location of complaints was combined with a knowledge of prevailing
winds in the area to determine the geographical boundaries of the action. Everyone within those boundaries was to have his rights vis-h.vis the defendant determined in a single action. The court, in explaining the rationale for geographical delineation, said:
Without such geographical delineation any person who felt that
he had been aggrieved by defendant's operation of its coal dock,
regardless of the geographical remoteness of his claim, would have
had the right to gain redress in this Court. Through this limitation the Court is able to give attention to the vast body of claims
for which a reasonably plausible geographical basis can be determined, avoid placing great strain on its docket with numerous actions with only nuisance value, and preserve to the truly aggrieved
individual whose claim is geographically remote his right of action
(since he, not
being a member of the class, is not bound by the
0
judgment).,7
The use of a carefully limited, geographically defined class has been
successfully utilized in similar cases.18 °
Illustrative of the institutional delineation approach is Nolop v.
Volpe,18 1 a suit by two students of the University of South Dakota on
behalf of all members of the student body to halt construction of an
interstate highway through the campus. In finding that all the re176. DeBremaecker v. Short, 433 F.2d 733, 734 (5th Cir. 1970).
177. 309 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ohio 1969).
178. See discussion in text accompanying notes 104-12 supra.
179. 309 F. Supp. at 355-56.
180. See, e.g., Foster v. City of Detroit, 405 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1963) (all persons
within an area of 25 city blocks); Izaak Walton League v. Macchia, 329 F. Supp. 504
(D.NJ. 1971) ("all persons having beneficial rights and interests in the subaqueous
lands, tidal marshes, tidal waters and related natural marine resources in the vicinity
of Gravens Island, Middle Township, Cape May County, New Jersey." Id. at 507).
181. 333 F. Supp. 1364 (D.S.D. 1971).
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quirements of rule 23(a) were met,18 2 the court implicitly recognized
that determination of whether a particular individual was or was not

a member of the class could be made by reference to the University's
records.
In contrast to Biechele and Nolop are the pleadings in Yannacone

v. Montrose Chem. Co. in which plaintiff sought to represent "all the
people of the United States, not only of this generation, but of those
generations, yet unborn, . . . who are entitled to the full benefit, use

and enjoyment of the environment and natural resources of the several States and the United States without damage and degradation
from the production, distribution and use. .." of D.D.T.188 Though
such a class is definable in the sense that anyone who might walk into

court would be a member of it, it hardly meets the functional criteria that rule 23 was designed to implement. 8 4

For the serious en-

vironmental plaintiff, geographical or institutional class delineation
would seem to be the approach most likely to fulfill the requirement
that an ascertainable class exist.
2.

Class Membership

Once a proper class has been defined, the representative party
must then show that he is a member of that class. 188 This is the second
of the implied requirements under rule 23(a), and it is based upon

the requirements of rule 17(a) that the real party in interest prosecute the suit1 86 and of rule 23 (a) that "[o]ne or more members of a
class may sue or be sued as representative parties ...

87

The re-

182. Id. at 1366.
183. No. 3761-69 (S.D.N.Y., filed Oct. 14, 1969), quoted in Lamm & Davison,
supra note 1, at 63.
184. See also Fischer v. American Smelting & Refining Co., No. 70-CIU-729
(S.D.N.Y., filed Feb. 24, 1970). In Fischer the plaintiff first sought to represent:
[C]itizens and residents of Texas, New Mexico, and Mexico, who have suffered
injury, damages, annoyance, and inconvenience from the alleged pollution of
the air by the defendants, and those who have shown "a special interest" in
protecting the public, their property, and the environment from damage by
air pollution.
Id., quoted in Lamm & Davison, supra note 1, at 64. Not content with the international flavor of their pleadings, plaintiffs amended their complaint, added new
plaintiffs and sued:
[O]n behalf of all those people, both of this generation and of generations yet
unborn, entitled to the protection of their health and welfare and to the
protection of their environment from damage from the failure of the defendant
to install "state-of-the-art" pollution control equipment.
Id.at 63-64.
185. Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962).
186. 7 WRIGHT & MilLER § 1761, at 585.
187. FED.R. Civ. P. 23(a) (emphasis added).
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quirement assumes considerable importance inenvironmental litigation
when a class action is brought by a conservation organization or a
similar organizational plaintiff on behalf of itself and those similarly
situated. The issue is frequently lost in a discussion of standing and
never directly addressed,' 88 but at least one court has specifically considered the issue. In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hoerner
Waldorf Corp.,1 89 the organizational plaintiff, a New York non-profit
corporation, sued on behalf of "all those entitled to the full benefit, use
and enjoyment of the . . . Missoula Regional Ecosystem."' 190 After
denying defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of standing, the district
court proceeded to dismiss the class allegations "[b]ecause the plaintiff
is not a member of the class it alleges to represent. ....191
Two possible exceptions to this rule have been recognized. In
some cases an organizational plaintiff has been allowed to sue if it has
specific authority 9 ' or, as the court in Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency noted, "where its raison d'9tre is to represent the
interests of . . . [the] class."'0 3 Addressing itself to the language
quoted above, the court in Hoerner Waldorf dismissed it as dictum
"and in any event not persuasive." '94 A more logical exception seems
to be provided by the Eighth Circuit in Smith v. Board of Education.'9 5
In that case the fact that one plaintiff, Arkansas Teachers Association,
was not technically an individual class member was found to be an insufficient basis for a rule 23(a) dismissal because plaintiff had standing
and was a real party in interest under rule 17(a).19 6 Whether Norwalk CORE and Smith provide an exception applicable only to civil
rights cases or whether they constitute a proper rationale for the organizational plaintiff to escape the class membership requirement may
be a superfluous issue in light of the recent decision in Sierra Club v.
Morton. 9 7 Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, said, "It is clear
that an organization whose members are injured may represent those
188.
1971).
189.
190.
191.

See, e.g., Izaak Walton League v. Macchia, 329 F. Supp. 504, 510-13 (D.N.J.
1 E.R.C. 1640 (D. Mont. 1970).
Id.
Id. at 1641. But cf. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers,

325 F. Supp. 728, 736 (E.D. Ark. 1971).

192.
(D. Del.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

National Hairdressers' & Cosmetologists' Ass'n v. Philad Co., 3 F.R.D. 199
1943).
395 F.2d 920, 937 (2d Cir. 1968).
1 E.R.C. at 1641.
365 F.2d 770 (8th Cir. 1966).
Id. at 777.
405 U.S. 727 (1972); see discussion in text accompanying notes 155-61 supra.
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members in a proceeding for judicial review."'198 Rule 23 is merely
another form of representative action. As long as the requirements of
the rule are met, there seems to be no valid reason for denying the or-

ganizational plaintiff representative capacity simply because the organization itself cannot show injury in fact.
3.

Impracticalityof Joinder

Rule 23(a)(1) requires that a class action may be maintained
only where "the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable." Though it is quite clear that "impracticable" does not
mean "impossible,"' 199 there are no hard and fast rules as to how many
class members are needed before the realm of impracticality has been

reached.20° The most that can be said is that impracticality of joinder
is a case-by-case determination. Professor Moore discusses the impracticality ("numerosity") criterion as follows:
Neither the multiplicity of parties, nor the inexpediency nor
the inconvenience of bringing parties before the court will, in
themselves, justify the class suit; they are, however, matters which
evidence impracticality.
A reading of the cases convinces one that whether a number
is so large that it would be impractical to join all the parties is
dependent not upon any arbitrary limit, but rather upon the cirand there must be a positive
cumstances surrounding the case;
201
showing of such circumstances.

Most cases which have been decided in the environmental area have
been sufficiently large to obviate the necessity of discussing rule 23

(a)

(1).202

Where impracticality has been contested, the response has

generally been conclusory rather than explicative. 20 3

When and if the

198. 405 U.S. at 739.
199. Goldstein v. North Jersey Trust Co., 39 F.R.D. 363, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
200. Classes of eighteen [Coffman v. City of Wichita, 165 F. Supp. 765 (D. Kan.),
aff'd per curiam, 261 F.2d 112 (10th Cir. 1958)], twenty [Ciaramitaro v. Woods, 324
F. Supp. 1388 (E.D. Mich. 1971)], and twenty-six [Corporation of Haverford College
v. Reeher, 329 F. Supp. 1196 (E.D. Pa. 1971)] have been held too small to permit a
a class action under rule 23. But classes of eighteen [Cypress v. Newport News Gen. &
Nonsectarian Hosp. Ass'n, 375 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1967)], twenty-five [Philadelphia
Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 463 (E.D. Pa. 1968)] and
thirty-five [Fidelis Corp. v. Litton Indus., Inc., 293 F. Supp. 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)]
have been held large enough to make joinder impracticable.
201. 3B Moo" I 23.05. See also 7 WMGHT & MImLER § 1762.
202. Frequently cases brought under rule 23 (b) (3) raise the opposite consideration
-is the class too numerous? This problem of the unmanageability of the class
action involving large numbers of class members is treated in the text accompanying
notes 296-309 infra.
203. See, e.g., Foster v. City of Detroit, 405 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968). Plaintiffs
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rule 23 (b) (3) class action seeking damages becomes a viable procedure,
litigation involving rule 23(a) will probably increase as class action
representatives begin to narrow the scope of their class to meet the
manageability criterion of rule 23 (b) (3).204
4.

Common Questions

Rule 23(a)(2) requires that "there be questions of laW or fact
common to the class." Most commentators have found that this provision adds little, if anything, to the substance of rule 23; indeed, the
requirement that there be common questions seems implicit in each of
the three types of class actions under subsection (b) of rule 23.205
Consequently, most courts have either ignored the requirement or
20
found it satisfied without elaboration.

6

A finding of common questions sufficient to justify the use of a
class action assumes much greater importance in the context of rule
23(b)(3) in which the stricter requirement that "common questions
predominate" becomes applicable. Thus subsection (b)(3)-type class
actions tend to swallow up the subsection (a) (2) requirement in a con07
sideration of predominance.
5.

Typicality
Rule 23(a)(3) makes necessary a showing that "the claims or

defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or debrought suit against the city for loss of property value during a ten year period in
which the defendant kept condemnation proceedings pending against the property before
finally discontinuing the planned renewal project. The court held: "Clearly the
number of persons in an area encompassing nearly 25 city blocks is too large for it
to be practicable to bring them all before the court." Id. at 146.
204. See discussion in text accompanying notes 296-309 infra.
205. See 3B MooRE 23.06-1, at 23-301; 7 WRIGHT & MILLER § 1763, at 609-10.
206. In Nolop v. Volpe, 333 F. Supp. 1364 (D.S.D. 1971), discussed in the text
accompanying note 181 supra, the court held that the question of the applicability of the
National Environmental Policy Act was common to all members of the class and
satisfied rule 23(a) (2). The holding in Nolop would seem to cast doubt upon the
interpretation of Professors Wright and Miller that "the use of the plural 'questions'
suggests that more than one issue of law or fact must be common to members of the
class." 7 WRIGHT & MILLER § 1763, at 604. Though perhaps other common questions could be distilled from the factual situation in Nolop, the Court made no effort
to define common questions of fact, relying entirely on a single common question of
law to satisfy rule 23(a)(2). For a sampling of the types of issues which have been
held to constitute "common questions" outside of the environmental area, see 3B
MooRE 23.06-1, at 23-302 to -303; 3B MooRa f 23.06-1, at 27-30 (Supp. 1972).
207. See In re Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equip., 52 F.R.D. 398 (C.D.
Cal. 1970). The predominance requirement of rule 23(b) (3) is discussed in the text
accompanying notes 271-94 infra.
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fenses of the class." The requirement of typicality also seems merely
duplicative of other provisions of rule 23 and has been largely ignored
or summarily treated by the courts.

One writer has defined the typi-

cality provision as follows:
The requirement that the claim of the representative be typical
of those of the entire class is the same as stating that the interests
of the representative party must coincide with, and "be compatible
with and not antagonistic to those whom he would represent.1 208

This is no more than is required by the adequacy of representation requirement of rule 23(a)(4), 20 and most courts have interpreted subsection (a)(3) in conjunction with (a)(4).210
Even if the typicality requirement has little, if any, substantive
meaning by itself, two problem areas require that pleading under rule
23(a)(3) be more than a matter of form. One problem, especially
prevalent in subsection (b)(3) class actions, arises when individual
olass members have claims arising from differing factual settings or
where there is a disparity in the damages claimed by the representative
parties and those that the unnamed class members can be reasonably

expected to claim. At least one court has held that "typical" means
"that the interests of the named representatives in a class action must
be co-extensive with the interests of all other members of the proposed

class. 12 11 Most courts seem to adopt a more relaxed standard, finding
that it is the nature of the claim and not the facts on which it arose
or the relief sought that must be typical. 212 Adoption of this latter,
208. Lamm & Davison, infra note 1, at 80 (footnotes omitted).
209. See text accompanying notes 219-36 infra.
210. City of Chicago v. General Motors Corp., 332 F. Supp. 285 (N.D. 111. 1971),
aff'd, 467 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1972). The court in City of Chicago dismissed plaintiffs products liability class action for failure to meet the requirements of rule 23(a).
In its opinion the court quoted rule 23(a)(3) and (a)(4) together, and, treating it as
a single requirement, stated:
Essentially, this rule establishes adequacy of representation as a prerequisite
to the bringing of a class action and requires that "the interest of the representative party must be coextensive with the interests of the other members
of the class, and that there be a lack of adverse interests between the representative party and other members of the class." 3B MooRE
23.06-2, at
23-325 (1969).
Id. at 287.
Rule 23(a)(3) has also been read in conjunction with rule 23(a)(2) (existence
of common questions). See Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp.
391 (S.D. Iowa 1968).
211. Insley v. Joyce, 330 F. Supp. 1228, 1234 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
212. In a class action against the two major odd-lot brokers on the New York
Stock Exchange, the plaintiff, representing a class of over 3 million persons, charged
that the brokers had conspired to monopolize trading and to fix the odd-lot differential
at an excessive figure. The Second Circuit, per Judge Medina, stated: "[P]laintiff's
claim is 'typical of the claims . . . of the class'. . . . [A]lithough there are varying
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more permissive standard of typicality can be very important for the
environmental litigant seeking damages for pollution-related injuries
under rule 23(b)(3) since there will almost certainly be varying types
and scope of harm for each class member or his property. A consideration of this variance of degree of injury among class members, while
214
2
relevant to the questions of predominance 13 and manageability,
should not preclude a finding of typicality unless there is a significant
difference in the basic structure of the representatives' claims as compared with the claims of other class members. 215
A second problem, noted by Professor Moore, may arise from a
court's belief that some members of the class "may prefer to leave the
violation of their rights unremedied.1' 218 Rule 23(a)(3) does not set
out a subjective test to be applied by the judge according to his view
of whether class members other than the representatives wish the suit
to be brought. 1 7 The difficulty stems from an attempt to distinguish
between a judge's subjective finding that claims are not typical and his
finding under rule 23(a)(4) that the representative cannot adequately
represent the class because they have interests antagonistic to other
class members.21 ' The rule itself is too vague to be helpful in making
such a distinction. The best course of action would probably be for
litigants to attempt to skirt the problem by carefully delineating the
class and by utilizing rule 23(c)(4) devices such as subclasses or the
class action for particular issues.
6.

Adequacy of Representation

Rule 23 (a) (4) provides that a class action is maintainable only
where "the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class." Of the four express prerequisites of rule 23(a),
fact patterns underlying each individual odd-lot transaction, the same allegedly unlawful differential is charged to all buyers and sellers." Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968). A similar approach was taken where the issue
was a disparity of damages between class representatives and other class members.
Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559 (D. Minn. 1968).
213. See text accompanying notes 270-93 infra.
214. See text accompanying notes 296-309 infra.
215. See Degnan, Foreword: Adequacy of Representation in Class Actions, 60
CAL. L. REv. 705 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Degnan].

216. 3B MooRE f 23.06-2, at 23-327.
217. Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 937
(2d Cir. 1968); Snyder v. Board of Trustees, 286 F. Supp. 927, 931 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
But cf. Ward v. Luttrell, 292 F. Supp. 165 (E.D. La. 1968).
218. The requirement that the representatives have interests compatible with those
they seek to represent is more fully discussed in the text accompanying notes 219-36
infra.
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subsection (4) is probably the most vital because of its role in assuring
due process 19 to unnamed class members. This is especially true since
the 1966 amendment to rule 23 which made judgments in subsection
(b)(3) actions binding upon the class unless the would-be class member exercises his privilege to exclude himself under rule 23(c)(2)KA).220
The due process problem that the class action device raises is

easily recognized; it is much more difficult to explain how the words
"adequacy of representation' fulfill the constitutional demand. The
most highly regarded statement of the meaning of "adequacy of representation" is that by Judge Medina in Eisen v. Carlisle& Jacquelin.22 '
Judge Medina's opinion sets forth several "ingredients" of adequate representation: (1) competent counsel; 222 (2) lack of interests antagonistic to other class members; 223 and (3) case-by-case assessment of
the "quality" of representation rather than an emphasis of "quantitative elements."'224 Each of these elements has been widely discussed
in case law outside the environmental area.225
The ingredient that has received the widest attention in environ219. "If the absent members are to be conclusively bound by the result of an
action prosecuted or defended by a party alleged to represent their interests, basic
notions of fairness and justice demand that the representation they receive be adequate." 7 WRIGHT & MILLER § 1765, at 617. The leading case on the constitutional
dimensions of adequacy of representation in class actions is Hansberry v. Lee, 311
U.S. 32 (1940).
220. 7 WRIGHT & MILLER § 1765, at 615-17; Degnan at 710.
221. 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968). The Second Circuit ultimately dismissed the
Eisen case because of failure to give proper notice under rule 23(c) (2) and because
it was unmanageable under rule 23(b)(3). Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, Nos. 72-1521,
30934 (2d Cir., May 1, 1973), rev'g 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). The holding
that Eisen could not be maintained as a class action, while important for reasons to
be discussed later, would not seem to affect that court's conclusions as to the adequacy of representation expressed in its earlier ruling. The court specifically stated
that it did not reach the question. Id. at 3234.
222. 391 F.2d at 562.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 563. Judge Medina felt that the district court placed undue reliance
on "quantitative elements", e.g., the amount of Eisen's claim ($70), the fact that he
was the only representative of the class, and the number of class members he alone
sought to represent (over 3 million).
225. As to competence of counsel, see Carpenter v. Hall, 311 F. Supp. 1099, 1114
(S.D. Tex. 1970) (competence of counsel revealed through earlier experience in the
particular type of litigation); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 496 (E.D.N.Y.
1968), rev'd on other grounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1970) (court's assessment of
competence in the early stages of litigation).
For a collection of the various types of interests that have been found to be conflicting or antagonistic, see 7 WRIGHT & MILLER § 1768, at 640 n.97.
A discussion of the quality factor and the extent to which the size of representative parties' claims bear on adequacy can be found in 7 WRuGHT & MILLER §§ 1766-67.
See also 3B Moonn 23.07[4].
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mental class suits is that dealing with antagonistic interests. The court
in Nolop v. Volpe, 2 86 while noting that the student class members were
represented by "competent counsel, ' 22 7 seemed to place greater emphasis on the fact that "[a] student poll received in evidence indicated
that over 80% of the students support this action.

. .

so that the rep-

resentative parties do fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class. '228 While a representative party does not have to show affirm229
atively that a majority of the class find his representation adequate,
the court in Nolop seems clearly correct in using such an affirmative
showing as a factor in its determination of adequacy. But was the
court in Nolop correct in the inferences that it drew from the poll?
The fact that eighty percent of the students favored the suit would seem
to mean that a rather significant proportion (twenty percent) of the
students had conflicting interests.28 ° Student disagreement over
whether the suit should be brought, however, is not a "conflicting or
antagonistic interest' for purposes of determining adequacy of representation. The classic example of antagonistic interests was the plaintiff who sought to enforce a racially restrictive covenant on behalf of
a class of landowners, part of whom were desirous of enforcing it and
part of whom sought to prevent its application. 23 1 But in Nolop there
is no question of enforcing rights held by persons whose interests dictate that the rights not be enforced. Either a proper impact statement
was filed in Nolop or it was not. As the court in Snyder v. Board of
Trustees recognized: "Resolution of this issue will, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the rights of all other members of the class,
'
Most
whether or not they approve of the maintenance of this suit."232
environmental class suits challenging the validity of administrative action for failure to abide by statutory requirements or administrative
regulations would thus seem to have greater leeway in defining a class
because they will decide the issue for the class, one way or the other,
226. 333 F. Supp. 1364 (D.S.D. 1971); see discussion in text accompanying note
181 supra.
227. 333 F. Supp. at 1367.
228. Id. at 1366-67.
229. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 564 (2d Cir. 1968).
230. Cf. Snyder v. Board of Trustees, 286 F. Supp. 927 (N.D. 111. 1968) (a class
action by unincorporated association of students and several faculty members was
allowed even though some members of the student body and faculty did not approve
of the action).
231. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
232. 286 F. Supp. at 931. Accord, Rosado v. Wyman, 322 F. Supp. 1173,
1193-94 (E.D.N.Y.), affd on other grounds, 437 F.2d 619 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 397 (1970).
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regardless of antagonistic interests within the class.2"'
A different result can be anticipated, however, in environmental
class actions seeking damages.

Corp.213 4

In City of Chicago v. General Motors

the City sought to represent "all Illinois citizens who are resi-

dents of the municipality" and whose health was endangered by de-

fendant's failure to install anti-pollution devices on its automobiles.
Plaintiff claimed injury to itself because defendant's conduct interfered
with "the maintenance of its property and the performance of its cor-

porate functions of protecting the health and welfare of its citizens
and . . . reduced the revenues of the city."235

In finding that the

plaintiff did not adequately represent 'the class, the court noted that
although plaintiff and its class shared "in a common atmospheric con-

dition," there were significant portions of the class who would not
seek damages, even if it were shown that such a right to relief existed.
Specifically the court pointed to "many motor vehicle dealerships, repair and service stations, and gasoline outlets" and to those citizens

"who are strongly attached to the motor vehicle as a recreational or
luxury item and would not want their individual activities curtailed

or made more expensive" as being adversely affected. 280 Thus where
the right to be enforced is an individual right, such as money damages

for personal or property damage, a court may be more intent to demand that the representative define his class free of antagonistic interests as far as possible.
City of Chicago involved more than a determination that representation was inadequate because of antagonistic interests or that the
233. This distinction can perhaps be more clearly understood by reference to Professor Hobfeld's concept of the jural opposites, "privilege" and "duty". In the example of the racial covenant, the class member may be thought of as possessing a
"privilege" to enforce the covenant See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940), and
text accompanying note 231 supra. Some class members wished to assert that
privilege; others did not. Where class members have such a privilege in common, a
court should apply rule 23(c)(4) so as to exclude from the class those members who
did not seek to assert the privilege. However, the class representative in Nolop is
asserting not that he has a privilege to prevent the building of the highway but that
the Secretary of Transportation has a "duty" to see that an environmental impact
statement is filed with regard to the proposed highway construction. Such a duty
may exist whether or not the other members of the class wish to challenge the Secretary's failure to comply with his statutory duty. Antagonistic interests of this latter
type should not defeat a finding of adequacy of represenation under rule 23(c)(4).
See generally 1 H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 141-53 (tent. ed. 1958); Corbin, Legal Analysis
and Terminology, 29 YALE L.J. 163 (1919).
234. 332 F. Supp. 285 (N.D. Ill. 1971), a! 'd, 467 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1972).
235. Id. at 287-88.
236. Id. at 288.
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plaintiff's claims were not typical of those of other class members.
Also at issue was the question of whether, given lack of antagonistic
interests, a governmental body could ever be an adequate representative of its citizens in a class action. The court in City of Chicago
merely skirted the issue by stating that it knew of no cases allowing
23 7 Witha municipality to bring a class action on behalf of its citizens.
out deciding the issue of whether the city was a member of the class,

and thus a proper representative, it relied on the city's failure to satisfy
the rule 23(a)(4) prerequisite discussed above. 3 s
Unknown to the court in City of Chicago, the validity of a class
action by a municipal corporation had been discussed a year earlier in
In re Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equipment.2 39

Various gov-

ernmental plaintiffs, state and local, sought damages for an alleged conspiracy on the part of motor vehicle manufacturers to prevent the installation of anti-pollution equipment. Some of the actions asked for
damages for individual citizens; others sought damages only for other
237. Class actions brought by a state or other governmental unit must be distinguished from the parens patriae suit by such governmental body. The two types
of suits have received their clearest interpretation in the area of consumer class
actions--an area analogous to, and sometimes overlapping, the environmental class
suit. In the leading case of West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079,
1089-91 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Cotler Drugs, Inc. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co.
404 U.S. 871 (1971), the Second Circuit relied on the dual rationale of class actions
or parenspatriae suit.
One commentator has referred to the parens patriae suit as nothing more than
a "super class action," the only difference from a rule 23 class action being the
"nature of the representative." Comment, Wrongs Without Remedy: The Concept
of Parens Partiae Suits for Treble Damages Under the Antitrust Laws, 43 S. CAL. L.
REV. 570, 593 (1970). However, there does seem to be a difference between the two
as to the theory for the recovery of damages. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 301 F.
Supp. 982, 986 (D. Hawaii 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 431 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir.
1970), aff'd, 405 U.S. 251 (1972). The Pfizer case makes this clear. So long as
the state has a claim against the defendant which meets the jurisdictional amount
(here there was no requirement because an antitrust violation was alleged), it may
sue on that claim and assert, parens patriae, the smaller claims of its citizens under a
theory of ancillary jurisdiction. The major limitation on parens partiae suits is evident; the state must have a claim individually against the defendant (in Pfizer, the
purchase of antibiotics for use by welfare recipients). The importance of this suit
for overcoming problems raised by the requirement of $10,000 in controversy is discussed in the text accompanying notes 96-99 supra. The second theory of Pfizerthe rule 23 action-seems to be based on an assignment of claims by citizens to the
state or its attorney general. Once again, a theory for avoiding the jurisdictional
amount problem can be seen. Professors Wright and Miller suggest that if such a theory
holds up it might permit the state to sue on behalf of its citizens, even though it
had no individual claim against the defendant. 7A WRIaGHT & MILLER § 1782, at
108-09; see discussion in text accompanying notes 100-103, supra.
238. 332 F. Supp. at 288.
239. 52 F.R.D. 398 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
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similarly situated governmental units (for example, all the cities in the
United States). The court first dismissed all suits brought parens patrine.2 40 It then stated:
[Tihe question raised is the adherence to the principle that a
plaintiff representative must be a member of the class purportedly
represented. It is conceivable that a governmental agency might,
with reference to a particular act or series of acts, stand in the
same position as an individual resident within its jurisdiction.
But in the context of the acts alleged herein and any impact and/
or damage resulting therefrom, a governmental agency raises issues which are peculiar only to its status as a governmental agency.
It cannot, therefore, be a member of the class of citizens or residents and cannot maintain a class action on behalf of individual
plaintiffs.
The representation of governmental agencies
as a class is, of
2 41
course, properly the subject of a class action.

Under this view a state or other governmental unit cannot sue on the
basis of such quasi-sovereign interests as "health, safety and welfare"
of its citizens, interstate water rights, or protection of its atmosphere
from interstate pollutants and at the same time bring claims on behalf
of its citizens for individual damages. The state or city must "stand
in the same position as the individual" as to "a particular act or series
of acts" in order to be held to be a member of the class.

The use of the class action device by a governmental plaintiff
suing on behalf of its citizens may not be as limited as the Motor Vehicle case might suggest. Justice Marshall, in his recent opinion in
Hawaii v. Standard Oil Company,24 2 seemed to invite the use of the
class action by a state on behalf of its citizens. Hawaii had originally
brought both a class action and a parens patriae suit on behalf of its
citizens for an injunction and monetary damages because of defend-

ant's alleged conspiracy to restrain the marketing and sale of refined
petroleum products. The District Court had dismissed the class action
and only the propriety of the parens patriae suit was reviewed by the

Supreme Court. While finding that the State's allegation of an injury
to its "general economy" was not an injury to "business or property"
240. "The status of parens patriae cannot be used to substitute for a class action
as to individual claims of the residents of political subdivision [sic]." Id. at 401.
As to this point the court cited Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 301 F. Supp. 982 (D.
Hawaii 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 431 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1970), a! 'd, 405
U.S. 251 (1972); see discussion at note 237 supra.
241. 52 F.R.D. at 405.
242. 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
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within the meaning of the Clayton Act and that the State could thus
not sue parenspatriae,243 the Court went on to note:
The District Court dismissed Hawaii's class action only because
it was unwieldy; it did not hold that a State could never bring a
class action on behalf of some or all of its consumer citizens.
Respondents . . . virtually conceded that class actions might be
appropriate under certain circumstances ....
Parenspatriae actions may, in theory, be related to class actions, but the latter are definitely preferable in the antitrust area.
Rule 23 provides specific rules for delineating the appropriate
plaintiff-class, establishes who is bound by the action, and effectively prevents duplicative recoveries.2 44
Whether courts will see fit to apply this language to environmental actions, and under what circumstances, remains to be seen. Though
certain fact situations, even under the restrictive interpretation of the
Motor Vehicle case, are appropriate for class action treatment, 245 the
usefulness of such a suit by a governmental body, in light of Hawaii,
remains an open question.
B.

THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 23(b)

The requirements of rule 23(a) have been discussed at length for
a simple reason: most environmental class actions have failed to meet
them. Even if the class plaintiff can satisfy the above prerequisites, he
still must fit his action within one of the three categories of rule 23(b)
and fulfill the requirements set out in that category.
The environmental class plaintiff will normally frame his action
under either subsection (b)(2) or subsection (b)(3), depending upon
whether he seeks an injunction or damages. However, there are occasions when subsection (b)(1) may be appropriate because of the effect that the injunctive or damage relief will have either upon the party
opposing the class or on individual members of the class. The categories of rule 23(b) are not mutually exclusive. Thus, an action may
very well be maintainable under two different categories of the rule.
Where the action is maintainable under either subsections (b)(1) or
(b)(2), the choice of which category controls is not significant since
the same res judicata effect can be achieved under either category.
243. Id. at 265.
244. Id. at 266.
245. See West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1097 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. Codler Drugs, Inc. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
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However, where there is a choice between subsections (b)(1) and
(b)(3) or (b)(2) and (b)(3), courts will normally chose the (b)
(1) or (b)(2) categories over (b)(3). In this manner the court can
avoid the requirement that class members be given the option to exclude themselves from the action and the notice requirements that are
peculiar to subsection (b)(3) actions.246
1. Rule 23(b)(1)
The subsection (b)(1) class suit is designed to deal with the risks
of separate adjudications to the party who opposes the class (subsection (b) (1) (A)) or to individual class members (subsection (b)
(1)03)). At least one environmental class action has utilized the
(b) (1) category.

In Biechele v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co. 247

plaintiffs sought both an injunction against defendants' coal storage and
loading operation and damages for injury from coal dust to their persons and property.2 48 In response to plaintiffs' request for injunctive
relief, the court allowed a class action to be maintained under rule
23(b)(1) and (b)(2).
In Biechele it is clear that the court's reliance on rule 23(b)(1)
referred to the dangers set out in subsection 03). "As a practical matter" an injunction sought by an individual member of the class would
have been "dispositive of the interests of the other members" of the
class.249 Were the injunction unsuccessful if sought by an individual
class member, the other class members who were not represented would,
in effect, be foreclosed from later seeking an injunction. The stare decisis effect of the first ruling would be difficult, if not impossible, to
overcome. To protect the interests of the entire class, a class action
under rule 23(b)(1)(B) was allowed.
'Like the categories of rule 23(b), the two subcategories of subsection (b)(1) are not mutually exclusive. Thus a class action may be
246. "When such options are available, the Court should treat the action as one
under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) instead of under (b)(3) in order to achieve the
purposes of the Rule which are to avoid a multiplicity of suits, provide common
binding adjudication, and prevent inconsistent or varying adjudications." Mungin
v. Florida E. C. Ry., 318 F. Supp. 720, 730 (M.D. Fla. 1970), affd per curiam, 441
F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1971). Cf. Nolop v. Volpe, 333 F. Supp. 1364 (D.S.D. 1971).
247. 309 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ohio 1969). With regard to problems of jurisdictional amount, see text accompanying notes 104-12 supra. With regard to class
delineation, see text accompanying notes 177-80 supra.
248. The damages issue in Biechele is discussed more fully in the text accompanying notes 285-90 and 324-26 infra.
249. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B).
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justified both to protect the interests of other class members and to
protect the opposing party. It is not difficult to think of a situation in
which individual litigations of property owners' rights and duties with
respect to a claimed nuisance would subject the defendant to incompatible adjudications.25 ° In such a case, rule 23(b)(1)(A) might be
applicable as well as rule 23(b)(1)(B).
The use of rule 23(b)(1) seems to be of rather limited utility
in environmental litigation. Whenever the problem is one of riparian
rights or enjoining a nuisance, however, its use should be considered.
2.

Rule 23(b)(2)

For the class plaintiff seeking injunctive relief, the obvious place
to look would seem to be rule 23(b)(2). The rule itself states that it
is designed for use when "final injunctive relief" is "appropriate."2" 1
But why bring a class action for an injunction? The injunction will
either be granted or it will not, and one plaintiff can sue just as effectively as one million. On its face, such an "all or nothing" argument seems convincing. When one considers the fact that the subsection (b)(2) plaintiff risks final defeat for the entire class, since there
is no provision allowing subsection (b)(2) class members to exclude
themselves from the class as with subsection (b)(3), the utility of
class suits seeking injunctions would seem to be marginal.
At least four reasons can be given in support of the usefulness
of the subsection (b)(2) class actions. An obvious reason is the sharing of the costs of litigation; a single plaintiff might not be able to afford the expense of pressing his claim. Where a number of plaintiffs
can join together to seek relief, an action may be possible when other252
wise it would not.
250. For example, what would the defendant in Biechele do if in one action he
was enjoined from storing the kind of coal which caused the dust problem while a second court in a separate action required that he install covered bins for storing the coal to
prevent the dust from escaping? With the growing use of partial and experimental
injunctions in nuisance cases, such a result is not inconceivable. See generally
D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 5.7 at 360-61 (1973).
In at least one environmental suit originally brought by several conservation
organizations, the defendant successfully petitioned the district court to have the suit
designated a class action: "The threat of harassment through consecutive lawsuits
was effectively foreclosed in this litigation by the court's order designating this suit
a class action ....
[I]n the absence of any requests to be excluded under Rule
23(c)(2) all members are bound by the decision of this court." Sierra Club v.
Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99, 110 (D. Alas. 1971).
251. FED. R. Cv. P. 23(b)(2).

252. Protection of the plaintiff with a small claim has long been recognized as a
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The subsection (b)(2) action also gives the class plaintiff a "psychological advantage" over the individual plaintiff, based on the notion
that there is strength in numbers.258 The Supreme Court recently
took note of this particular advantage when it stated:
Rule 23.

.

. provides for class actions which may enhance the ef-

ficacy of private actions by permitting citizens to combine 2their
limited resources to achieve a more powerful litigation posture. 54
This "more powerful litigation posture!' is not just a recognition by
the defendant that plaintiffs are financially more capable of pursuing
the action. Such a class action may spur the court's recognition that
plaintiffs are engaged in something more than a "strike!' suit. The
scope of the action, if brought on a class basis, together with the realization by defendant of both plaintiffs' financial ability to sustain the
litigation and their seriousness of purpose 2 15 may very well put defendant in a position in which the possibilities for settlement or compromise are greatly increased.256 Certainly this is more likely than if
defendant faced only a single plaintiff.
Aside from the psychological effect of the class suit generally,
the "strength in numbers" rationale assumes an even greater importance
in suits to enjoin a nuisance. The modem approach in determining
justification for the class device. 'To permit the defendants to contest liability with
each claimant in a single, separate suit, would, in many cases, give defendants an
advantage which would be almost equivalent to closing the door of justice to all
small claimants. This is what we think the class suit practice was [designed] to prevent." Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84, 90 (7th Cir. 1941).
One court has recently recognized this factor in an environmental class action:
"The policy reasons for permitting the conservation groups to represent the interests of
their members in a class action are compelling. Any other rule would have the
practical effect of preempting many meritorious actions, as one individual, or a small
number of individuals, would have to sustain the entire financial burden of the
lawsuit." Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99, 110-11 (D. Alas. 1971).

253. See Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class Actions, 9

BusrAo L. Rav. 433, 435 (1960).

254. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 266 (1972).
255. The psychological effect of instilling greater determination on the part of
class members in pursuing the litigation has been noted by one writer in the context
of consumer class actions:
The class action publicizes the named parties, clothed in the garb of dedicated
selfless individuals rather than as "malcontents and eccentrics" who are
attempting to upset the system by a frolic of their own.
. . . The class action compensates for a lack of cohesiveness and willingness to participate among poor persons which makes joint action by them
often ineffectual. There is now a common fight against a known foe.

Starrs, The Consumer Class Action-Part 11- Considerations of Procedure, 49 B.U.L.

IRv. 407, 410 (1969).
256. See, e.g., West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom. Cotler Drug Co. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
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whether a nuisance should be enjoined is a balancing of the hardships
and equities that will result to plaintiff if the nuisance is allowed to
continue and to defendant if he is forced to cease the nuisance-producing activity. 257 Whether plaintiff gets injunctive relief or only permanent damages (which, in effect, gives defendant an easement to continue his activities with regard to plaintiff's property) 258 will be determined by how successful the plaintiff is in demonstrating the extent
of the harm caused by the alleged nuisance. The use of a class action
in such a case might well be the determinative factor in balancing
the scales in favor of an injunction.
A final reason which supports the use of the class action to seek
injunctive relief rests on the likelihood that such actions are more likely
to call attention to the alleged environmental wrong and thus more
likely to elicit public support for the action. As one writer has commented:
Apart from its legal and economic advantages, the class action has still another appealing feature-its capacity for forcing
into public and judicial view the urgent issues concerning the contamination of the environment. In this respect the class action
has been described by one commentator as "the judicial analogue
to the mass demonstrations of the street [whose success] often
on
hinges less on the ultimate outcome of the particular case than 259
the publicity, visibility and aroused popular reaction it evokes."1

In assessing the usefulness of the subsection (b)(2) class action
in environmental litigation, one recent commentator concluded:
In the current state of the law . . .the environmental class action for injunctive relief . . .seems a poor strategic choice.

In-

discriminate selection of this form invites time-consuming objections by defendants eager to stall. More significantly, it also encourages adverse determinations by hostile judges, who are someto cloak substantive dismissal in the garb of
times only too glad
2 6.
procedural defect.

0

Despite this assessment, it should be noted that at least three recent
suits to enjoin activities in violation of the National Environmental Pol257. See generally D. DoBBs, R MDiEs § 5.7 (1973); Juergensmeyer, supra note

40, at 1130-34.
258. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870,
309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970). In a suit by a single plaintiff, the New York Court of
Appeals reversed the grant of an injunction against a $45 million cement plant and
granted permanent damages instead.
259. Comment, 16 WAYNE L. REv., supra note 1, at 1098 (quoting Starrs, supra
note 255, at 408).
260. Comment, 2 ECOL. L.Q., supra note 1, at 564.
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icy Act of 1969 (NEPA) have succeeded. Each was based on rule
23(b)(2), and each was aimed at a specific, limited objective. In
Nolop v. Volpe261 the court enjoined the construction of an interstate
highway through the campus of the University of South Dakota. It
found that failure of the Secretary of Transportation to file an environmental impact statement, as required by NEPA,26z was a refusal to act
"on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief." HarrisburgCoalitionv. Volpe2 8 involved
the construction of an interstate highway through a park in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. An ad hoc group of local residents joined in a
subsection (b)(2) class action challenging the failure of the Secretary
of Transportation to abide by several federal and state statutes governing highway construction 64 as well as NEPA. The court required
the Secretary of Transportation to submit an environmental impact statement in strict compliance with the standards set out in NEPA. The
organizational plaintiff in Izaak Walton League v. Macchia26 5 was
allowed to sue on behalf of "all persons having beneficial rights and
interests" in the tidal marshes surrounding an island of Cape May, New
Jersey.2 66 The subsection (b)(2) class action in Macchia was held
maintainable as to plaintiffs' claims under NEPA for an injunction, a
declaratory judgment, and pecuniary damages.2 67 The fear that a hostile judge would "cloak substantive dismissal in the garb of procedural
defect" was obviously misplaced, at least in this particular court.
The class action seeking injunctive relief, while obviously no panacea, can serve a specific, limited purpose in the environmentalists' still
meager arsenal. It has already demonstrated its usefulness in suits to
enforce the requirements of NEPA and related statutes. It would also
261. 333 F. Supp. 1364 (D.S.D. 1971); see text accompanying notes 181 and
226-32 supra.
262. Such a statement is required by § 102(2)(C) of the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
263. 330 F. Supp. 918 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
264. Department of Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. H§ 1651-58 (1970); Federal
Aid Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. H8 101-04 (1970); Pennsylvania Department of
Transportation Act of 1970, 71 P.S. § 512 (Supp. 1972).
265. 329 F. Supp. 504 (D.N.J. 1971).
266. Id. at 507.
267. Although the merits of Macchia remained to be heard by the court, it is
interesting to note that plaintiff's suit for an injunction to stop defendant's dredge and
fill operation was allowed to carry with it a claim for damages incurred by the class.
It is doubtful, however, that by merely pleading a damage claim together with a
claim for injunctive relief under rule 23(b)(2), a plaintiff can escape the normal
strictures that rule 23(b) (3) imposes on claims for damages.
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appear to be of significant value in common law nuisance claims where
there is diversity of citizenship or in which a state has a class action
device similar to rule 23(b)(2).
3.

Rule 23(b)(3)

Just as the environmental class action seeking an injunction will
normally be cast in terms of rule 23 (b) (2), the plaintiff who seeks
damages on behalf of a class will ordinarily frame his action under the
third category of rule 23(b). But for a very few exceptions, the case
law dealing with subsection (b)(3) class actions in the environmental
context is non-existent. One notable commentator has assumed that the
very nature of the requirements of rule 23 (b) (3) preclude an environmental class action seeking damages:
There has recently been a very great development of the so-called
"class action." This is a suit in which one or more persons of a
class whose rights are more or less similarly invaded can sue as
representatives of the class. There are certain limiting conditions
for such an action. There must be a common question of fact or
law and all of those in the class must be entitled to common relief.
Of course, were the object of the suit to secure damages the latter
condition would not be satisfied, since the amount of damages
among the members of the class would differ depending on the
amount and locationof the property of each.26 8
The writer takes an unnecessarily negative view. Although it is subject to the greatest abuse, rule 23(b) (3) is potentially the most valuable of the three categories for protecting the environment and the
rights of small-claim plaintiffs. A rule 23(b)(3) class action for
damages would certainly seem feasible where the plaintiff class is carefully delineated and the relief sought is reasonably circumscribed.
Much of the discussion that follows will necessarily rely on analogy
to the successful use of subsection (b)(3) class actions in securities
fraud and antitrust cases. Much of the usefulness of the discussion is
also dependent upon how strictly the jurisdictional amount standard is
interpreted by the Supreme Court in Zahn v. InternationalPaper CO.26 9
In order to maintain a subsection (b) (3) class action the plaintiffs must demonstrate, first, "that the questions of law or fact common
to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting
268. Jaffe, Standing to Sue in Conservation Suits, in LAw AN Tm ENVIRONMENT
123, 130-31, (M. Baldwin & J. Page eds. 1970) (emphasis added).
269. 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. granted, 93 S. Ct. 1370 (1973) (No.
72-888); see text accompanying notes 4-10 and 125-34 supra.
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only individual members" and secondly, "that a class action is superior
to other available methods ...
.
(1) Predominance. There is no well-defined test to determine
when common questions predominate, since there was no such requirement prior to the 1966 amendments to rule 23. It is clear that predominance does not call for a quantitative evaluation of how much
time will be spent litigating the common questions as opposed to those
questions that must be resolved individually for each class member. 7 '
Courts have also found predominance despite the fact that there is not
a complete identity of facts that relate to each class member, so long
as there is a "common nucleus of operative fact"2 72 or a "common
course of conduct 2 73 on the part of the defendant. Nor is it necessary that the common questions be determinative of the entire action.2" 4
270. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b) (3) (emphasis added).
271. The most emphatic rejection of the quantitative test was in Minnesota v.
United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559 (D. Minn. 1968), where the court, in an
antitrust case, reasoned as follows:
[It is true that as a class action more time in toto will be spent in proof of
individual damage claims . . . than will be spent in proof of conspiracy ...
Ilt would seem, however, that the situation should be considered and compared to that which would exist were no class action to be allowed. So for
instance, if there were to be but a single case for trial, the court would expect
that the great bulk of the time of that trial would be consumed with proof or
the attempted proof of the existence and effect of a conspiracy and that the
fraudulent concealment and damage issues would be far less predominant in
the sense of time consumed at trial. Were there to be 500 separate suits,
this same pattern undoubtedly would prevail as to each. It seems specious
and begging the question to say that if these 500 law suits were brought into
a class so that proof on the issues of conspiracy need be adduced only once
and the result then becomes binding on all 500, that thereby the common
issue of conspiracy no longer predominates because from a total time standpoint, cumulatively individual damage proof will take longer.
Id. at 569 (emphasis added).
272. This phrase was first coined in Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969). Although it was probable that defendant had made
differing oral misrepresentations to numerous purchasers of his securities, the court
found questions relating to the omission of certain material facts to be common to all
of these misrepresentations. "Consequently," the court concluded, "there does exist as
to the totality of issues a common nucleus of operative facts such as would justify
allowing the class action to proceed under . . . Rule 23." Id. at 99. Accord, Illinois
v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 484, 488 (N.D. 111. 1969) ("a common core of questions").
The application of this "common nucleus" test appears to be quite analogous to
the test for the finding of pendent jurisdiction announced in UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S.
715, 725 (1966), from which the key words were taken.
273. See, e.g., Epstein v. Weiss, 50 F.R.D. 387, 393 (E.D. La. 1970); Dolgow v.
Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 489 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 438 F.2d
825 (2d Cir. 1970).
274. "The fact that questions peculiar to each individual member of the class may
remain after the common questions have been resolved does not dictate the conclusion
that a class action is not permissible." Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 490
(E.D.N.Y. 1968).
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Professors Wright and Miller come no closer to defining a predominance
standard than the following statement:
[When common questions represent a significant aspect of
the case and they can be resolved for all members of the class in a
single adjudication, there is a clear justification for handling the
5
dispute on a representative rather than on an individual basis. 27
The standard is clearly a pragmatic one. Thus, with the relegation
of predominance-determination to a case-by-case approach, the success
of a subsection (b) (3) action may very well turn on the attitude of the
particular court to whom the predominance arguments are addressed.
In re Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equipment 76 is a good
example of the problem that faces the subsection (b)(3) litigant in
attempting to show predominance in an environmental case. Plaintiffs alleged an unusual type of antitrust injury in the Motor Vehicle
case: "injury resulting from pollution caused by the conspiracy to hinder and delay the research, development, manufacture and installation of
effective motor vehicle air pollution control equipment." The conspiracy alleged by the plaintiffs was, in effect, "a conspiracy to maintain a public nuisance-smog. 27 7 Thus, even though the court recognized that the conspiracy was a question common to all of the classes
involved in the action, it could not predominate over the individual
issues of "impact" and "damages." Unlike the price-fixing conspiracy
cases on which plaintiffs relied, 78 in which the question of defendants'
liability was concluded by a determination that a particular plaintiff
was a buyer at the illegally fixed price, the conspiracy alleged by the
plaintiffs in Motor Vehicle required a determination, first, that smog
could produce the type of injury alleged and, secondly, the amount of
such damages. Since the alleged smog-produced injuries-which the
court referred to as "impact"-would be "as varied as the public itself," 279 "impact" and the amount of damages were issues that would
have to be litigated individually. The court determined that common
questions did not predominate and thus that a class action on the par2 80
ticular issue of conspiracy could not be maintained.
275. 7A W~iGHT & MinLER § 1778, at 53 (emphasis added).
276. 52 F.R.D. 398 (C.D. Cal. 1970); see discussion in text accompanying note
239 supra.
277. 52 F.R.D. at 404.
278. In re Water Meters, 304 F. Supp. 873 (J.P.M.L. 1969); Illinois v. Harper &
Row Publishers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 484 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v.
Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
279. 52 F.R.D. at 404.
280. Under FED. P. CRv. P. 23(c) (4), "when appropriate . . . an action may be
brought or maintained with respect to particular issues . ..."
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It is interesting to note that the class actions in Motor Vehicle
that were found to be maintainable involved classes of political subdivisions of a state, public corporations or authorities, municipal corporations, and all of the farmers in the United States. As to these classes,
common questions were held to predominate.2 8 Only as to the class in
which governmental bodies attempted to represent their citizens individually were common questions found not to predominate. One wonders how the task of determining the effect of smog on "crops, fauna
and flora" will be measurably less difficult than determining its effect
on human beings, but the courts opinion gives no insight into this
anomaly. Perhaps the answer lies in the fact that the classes that were
held maintainable were smaller and more manageable, a rationale that
has nothing to do with the predominance of common questions.
A problem similar to that which the court faced in the Motor
Vehicle case was resolved in an identical manner in Diamond v. General Motors Corp., 82 a class action brought in the state courts of California. Plaintiffs in Diamond purported to represent a class composed
of all the citizens of Los Angeles County (7,119,184 persons) in a suit
against 293 industrial corporations and municipalities who were alleged to have polluted the atmosphere of the County. The crux of
plaintiffs' case was that defendants were maintaining a public nuisance.
Under California law, a private person could maintain an action for a
public nuisance only if it were "specially injurious to himself. 28 1 In
evaluating the difficulties that would arise in trying to resolve special
damages issues in a class setting, the court in effect summarized the
major problem that the subsection (b)(3) plaintiff must overcome in
federal court anytime he seeks damages:
Whether an individual has been specially injured in his person will depend largely upon proof relating to him alone-going
to such matters as his general health, his occupation, place of
residence, and activities. Whether a parcel of real property has
been damaged will depend upon its unique
characteristics, such as
its location, physical features and use. 284
At least two cases of considerably less magnitude have found com281.

"Although there may be some differences in the effect of smog on various

crops or the fauna and flora of a state, political subdivision, public corporation or
public authority, the pleadings as they now stand do allege a class properly represented
with respect to common issues of law and fact which predominate over questions
affecting only individual members." 52 F.R.D. at 404.
282. 20 Cal. App. 3d 374, 97 Cal. Rptr. 639 (Ct. App. 1971).
283. CAL. Civ. CODE § 3493 (West 1970).
284. 20 Cal. App. 3d at 379, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 643.
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mon questions to predominate. One, in which only an injunction was
sought under both subsections (b)(2) and (b)(3), found that the
common question of defendant's failure to file an environmental impact
statement predominated over any individual issues so as to justify the
(b)(3) action.28 8 The crucial area of consideration, however, is that
dealt with in Biechele v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co.281 As will
be recalled from an earlier discussion, Biechele involved the pollution
of a portion of Sandusky, Ohio, by coal dust from defendant's coal
storage and loading facilities. Assuming jurisdiction of plaintiffs' subsection (b)(3) action through removal jurisdiction, 2 7 the court held
without discussion that common questions predominated even though
it was obvious that if defendant were found liable the court would be
faced with 731 separate claims for damages.28 8 Though it could be
argued that most of these damages would be of a similar nature-the
cost of cleaning up the personal property on which the coal dust accumlated-the opinion of the court does not seem to bear out the notion that only a limited scope of damage recovery was being considered. "The factual conclusion is inescapable," the court stated, "that
the plaintiffs were injured in various respects, and to various extents,
in their real estate, their personal property and effects, and in their
persons by large quantities of coal dust blown from the shipping and
'289
storage facilities of the defendant.
What were the common questions in Biechele that were held to be
predominant? Clearly liability of the defendant was the major area
that the court found to be common to all members of the class. Just
as clearly, the amount of each class members' damages had to be determined individually. The only remaining issue was that of causation or, as the Motor Vehicle court put it, "impact." The Biechele
court made an attempt to handle part of the causation issue as a common question. It permitted testimony at trial to show the various types
of damage which could be caused by "airborne coal dust." 290 This
use of expert testimony to delineate the scope of actual causation was
important in that it reduced the scope of inquiry of the special master
285. Nolop v. Volpe, 333 F. Supp. 1364, 1367 (D.S.D. 1971).
286. 309 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ohio 1969); see discussion in text accompanying
notes 247-49 supra.
287. For a discussion of how the Biechele subsection (b)(3) action escaped the
jurisdictional amount requirement, see text accompanying notes 104-12 supra.
288. 309 F. Supp. at 355.
289. Id. at 357.
290. Id.
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appointed to determine damages. Plaintiffs were left in such a position that, individually, they had only to show that they were in fact injured and the amount of the injury.291 The question of whether defendant's conduct could cause plaintiffs' injury was determined largely
as a common question.
The innovative manner in which the court in Biechele handled
the problem of actual causation can be utilized in other types of pollution cases in which the effects of the pollutant on property and persons is capable of determination through expert witnesses. The plaintiffs can perhaps utilize subclasses under rule 23(c) (4) when the effects of the pollutant fall into specific categories. Even where the
causation issue cannot be determined in a common setting, plaintiffs
may still convince a court that a class action on a particular issuethe defendant's liability-will result in a considerable savings of the
court's time and effort and the parties' expense. Even where a court
is uncertain as to whether common questions predominate or a class
action on a particular issue is appropriate, the plaintiffs may seek a
"conditional order"2' 9 2 that the action is maintainable, subject to a later
alteration or amendment by the court striking the class action portion
of the complaint when it becomes clear that common questions do not
predominate or the action is unmanageable.
Most of the discussion that concerns meeting the standard of predominance in environmental actions for damages should be prefaced
with a caveat. Except for a case which arose before the 1966 amendments, 9 3 only the Biechele case provides a favorable precedent for
finding predominance under subsection (b) (3) in class actions for
damages. And Biechele, when one considers how jurisdiction over the
action was obtained,294 looms as a rather special case in itself.
(2) Superiority. Rule 23 (b) also requires that a class action
be "superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." The thrust of the superiority determination is explained by Professors Wright and Miller as follows:
291. Id. at 359.
292. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1).
293. Foster v. City of Detroit, 405 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968). Defendant brought
condemnation proceedings against property in a 25-block area; the proceedings remained pending for some 10 years before they were dismissed. Plaintiffs, residents of
the area, sued for damages resulting from the deterioration of property value while
the proceedings were pending. In an action under old rule 23's "spurious" class action
category, the court stated: "In the present case there are important common questions of law and fact affecting all members of the class which override the factual
differences regarding the damages suffered by each individual." Id. at 146.
294. See text accompanying notes 104-12 supra.
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The rule requires the court to make a determination that the objectives of the class action procedure really will be achieved in
the particular case. In determining whether the answer to this
inquiry is to be affirmative, the court must initially consider what
other procedures, if any, exist for disposing of the dispute before
it. It then must compare the possibilities to determine whether
Rule 23 is sufficiently effective to justify the expenditure of the
judicial time and energy that is necessary to adjudicate a class acto the rights of those who
tion and to assume the risk of prejudice
295
are not directly before the Court.
Among the alternatives to the class action that must be considered are
individual actions, the test case, and multidistrict consolidation. In
most environmental class actions the search for alternatives will be
fruitless; the question will be one of a class action or else no relief at
all. The environmental plaintiff seeking damages generally has a claim
too small to merit individual litigation other than in a class setting.
If the class action is maintainable, such that the other requirements of
rule 23(a) and (b) are met, a finding that it is superior to other
means of adjudicating the claim will, ordinarily, present no problem.2 9 6
(3) Manageability. To aid the court in determining predominance and superiority, rule 23(b) lists four factors that are "pertinent"
to its findings:
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions;
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum;
(D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management
of a class action.
Although the first three of these factors are by no means unimportant,297 the fourth-manageability-looms as the most crucial for the
environmental plaintiff. In most cases the manageability issue is closely
related to that of superiority; however, in environmental class actions
seeking damages, where there is usually no question of superiority, the
manageability standard assumes greater significance. The issue usually
determines whether or not there will be a lawsuit; if a class action is
295.
296.
to -808.
297.
(B) and

7A WRIGHT & MILLER § 1779, at 59 (emphasis added).
See 7A WRIGHT & MILLER § 1779, at 61; 3B MooRE

23.45[3], at 23-807

For a discussion of the meaning which courts have given to rule 23(b) (A),
(C), see 7A WRIGHT &MILLm § 1780, ;t 64-74,
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found to be unmanageable there will be no action, by a class or by an
individual, because plaintiffs' claims are normally too small to be worth
asserting individually.
Recognizing the "all or nothing" aspect of the manageability determination, the court in the Motor Vehicle case concluded:
Manageability of the classes alleged herein may certainly tax the
imagination and ingenuity of the litigants, counsel and the court.
But until management is recognized as impossible or near impossible, the Court will depend upon the ingenuity and aid of counsel
to solve the complex problems this litigation may bring. If successful, the economies of time, effort and expense will more than
compensate the effort. 298
While a court should never find an action unmanageable because it
will result in a complex, lengthy adjudication, 9 9 there is a point at
which the court must consider whether the court is capable of resolving the issues which plaintiffs present. Four problems are frequently
responsible for the judgment of the court that an action is unmanageable-the size of the class and the number of defendants, the scope
of relief requested, the presence of issues requiring individual adjudication, and the difficulties of providing proper notice to the class.
The size of the class and the scope of relief requested on its behalf are very often factors considered by a court even though it dismisses the case for other reasons. For example, the requirements of
rule 23(a) that there be a properly defined class and that it be adquately represented are essentially issues of management. The court
in City of Chicago v. General Motors Corp. 0 0 while it dismissed the
action under rule 23(a)(4) after finding antagonistic interests within
the class, could not have avoided consideration of the broader management problems that would result from any attempt to deal with "that
gigantic and extraordinarily diverse class." '0 And the court in Dia298. 52 F.R.D. at 404.
299. Professors Wright and Miller state:
In no event should the court use the possibility of becoming involved with
the administration of a complex lawsuit as a justification for evading the
responsibilities imposed on federal judges by Rule 23. If judicial management
of a class action, no matter what its dimensions may be, will reap the rewards
of efficiency and economy for the entire system that the draftsmen of the
federal rule envisioned, then the individual judge should undertake the task.
Ironically, those Rule 23(b) (3) actions requiring the most management may
yield the greatest payoff in terms of effective dispute resolution.
7A WRIGHT & MILLER § 1780, at 76.
300. 332 F. Supp. 285 (N.D. I1. 1971), affd, 467 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1972);
see text accompanying notes 234-38 supra.
301. 332 F. Supp. at 288.
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mond v. General Motors Corp.,"°2 even if it could have dealt with a
class of over seven million, recognized that it was being called upon to
do what the elected officials of the state had not done-i.e., find a solution to the problem of automobile pollution. The damage relief sought
by plaintiffs in Diamond would result, the court realized, in a situation
in which "the critical fact of injury would have to be litigated on distinct facts by each of the seven million residents against each of the
[293] defendants."3 0 3 Where the defendant is a single polluter and
the results of his pollution are clearly distinguishable from other sources
of pollution in an area, as in Biechele, manageability may be achieved.
But the relief sought by plaintiffs in Diamond (and most of the other
motor vehicle pollution cases), when considered with the size of
the class involved, presented issues that were beyond the competence
of the courts. Even utilization of the various techniques provided for
in rule 23(c) and (d) to facilitate administration cannot compensate
for the follies of the over-ambitious litigant.
The situation in Zahn v. International Paper C0.30 4 is different.
The court there reasoned that a class action was not proper because
assessment of two hundred damage claims would be "an enormously
time consuming task" 805 and, at any rate, rule 23(b)(3) was not intended for use in a mass tort situation. 80 6 But was the "tort" that
plaintiffs alleged in Zahn the type of claim that the Advisory Committee
had in mind when it delivered its judgment as to the utility of the subsection (b)(3) device in "mass accident" cases? Clearly there was a
tort in Zahn, but it was a tort that involved an intentional act and not
the negligence issues of a mass accident situation. 0 7 There appears to
be nothing "accidental" about defendants' action in Zahn. Then, too,
the Advisory Committee probably used the term "mass accident" to
refer to airplane crashes, train wrecks, and similar disasters in which
each plaintiff has a substantial claim for personal injury. While the
Advisory Committee felt that such claims could be left to the individual
plaintiffs without fear that the claims would not be brought absent
302.
303.
304.
72-888);
305.

20 Cal. App. 3d 374, 97 Cal. Rptr. 639 (Ct. App. 1971).
Id. at 379, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 643.
469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. granted, 93 S. Ct. 1370 (1973)
see text accompanying notes 4-10 supra.
469 F.2d at 1036.

(No.

306. The court in Zahn relies on an analogy to the suggestion of the Advisory

Committee on rule 23 that the rule was not designed for use in "mass tort" situations.
Id. See Advisory Committee Note, 103.
307. Indeed, this may very well be a case where a theory of strict liability is
applicable. Cf. Biechele v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 309 F. Supp. 354, 358 (N.D. Ohio
1969).
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the class setting, such is often not the case where an environmental tort
is alleged. As discussed earlier, 08 the question is essentially one of
maintaining a class action or receiving no relief at all. The latter result was not necessarily intended by the Advisory Committee in its
"mass accident" caveat.
The Zahn court's reliance on the "flood of litigation" argument
and the enormous amount of time that resolution of the damages issue
would require seems more obviously misplaced. At the very least,
a class action on the particular issue of liability would be manageable under rule 23(c)(4)(A). To throw plaintiffs out of court because they present small claims that are difficult to ascertain is to encourage polluters to insulate themselves from any liability by spreading
out the pollution so as to yield only small damage claims. "'Difficulty
of ascertainment [of damage] is no longer confused with right of recovery.' 309 To do so, Chief Justice Stone has said,
would enable the wrongdoer to profit by his wrongdoing at the
expense of his victim. It would be an inducement to make wrongdoing so effective and complete in every case as to preclude any
recovery, by rendering the measure of damages uncertain. 810
The Zahn court's remarks as to manageability are only dicta, the
jurisdictional amount question having already been decided against
plaintiffs, but what they portend for environmental class actions seeking damages, at least in the Second Circuit, is discouraging.
(4) Notice. In the preceding discussion, three of the four most
common manageability problems were discussed-size, scope of relief,
and presence of individual issues. The problem of notice is reserved
for separate discussion since it carries with it due process as well as
manageability considerations such as cost and practicability.
Rule 23(c)(2) requires that class members in subsection (b)(3)
class actions be given "the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort." Each class member must be advised
that (1) he can exclude himself from the class if he so requests and the
judgment will not ;include him, (2) if he does not exclude himself,
the judgment will include him "whether favorable or not," and (3)
he may enter an appearance through counsel if he does not wish to
be excluded. Rule 23(d)(2) provides for additional, discretionary
308.
309.
(1931),
310.

See text accompanying notes 295-97 supra.
Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 566
quoting Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 297 F. 791, 802 (1924).
Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264-65 (1946).
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notice procedures that the court may utilize in order to protect the in-

terests of the class.
Framed in the light of Mullane v. CentralHanover Bank & Trust
Co.,"" the requirements of rule 23(c)(2) are essential to guarantee
due process in subsection (b)(3) class actions. Those requirements,
however, leave a great deal of leeway to the courts to determine what
is "practicable" and when a "reasonable effort" has been made to identify individual class members. Thus the notice determination yields
itself only to a case-by-case approach, as the facts and circumstances
of each particular case dictate. The two primary notice problems with
which the environmental plaintiff in a subsection (b)(3) action must
be concerned are when individual notice is required and, if such notice
is not required, what other form of notice is the "best notice practicable
under the circumstances."
The question of whether individual notice is required has been
greatly illuminated by the Second Circuit's recent decision in Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin (Eisen II1). 12 Eisen was a class action brought
by a single plaintiff on behalf of over three million persons who purchased securities in odd lots on the New York Stock Exchange. Plaintiff alleged that defendants, the two major odd lot dealers, had conspired to monopolize trading and to fix the odd lot differential at an
excessive figure. The Second Circuit decided that the original dismissal
of the case had been too summary and had applied improper standards
under rule 23; the case was remanded to the district court for further
consideration (Eisen I). 81" Four years later, when the case returned
to the Second Circuit, the class had grown to more than six million
persons, of which 2,250,000 could be "easily identified." '14 In an attempt to comply with the notice provisions of rule 23, the district court
had ordered individual notice to the approximately two thousand class
members who had ten or more odd lot transactions during the period
relevant to the litigation and to five thousand other class members selected at random from among the 2,250,000 who were easily identifiable. As to the rest of the class, the court approved a schedule of
publications of the action designed to "increase the likelihood of reaching a significant portion of the class."3 15 In approving such a notice
procedure, the district court was aware of the fact that the initial finan311. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
312.
313.
314.
315.

Nos. 72-1521, 30934 (2d Cir., May 1, 1973).
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968).
Nos. 72-1521, 30934, at 3222.
Eisen v. Carlisle & lacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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cial burden of notice could be so prohibitive to representatives with
only small claims that a class action would become impossible. As the
court noted:
Where a class consists of a large number of claimants with relatively small individual claims, notice to individual class members,
as a legal and practical matter, becomes
less important and need
310
not be unduly emphasized or required.
Despite recognition of the district court's desire to make the class
action device viable in the case, the court of appeals disallowed the
district court's solution to the notice problems of Eisen. It held that
individual notice was not a matter of discretion on the part of the trial
judge but was controlled by the language of rule 23(c)(2) that "notice
to the class generally shall be the 'best notice practicable,' and then
'including individual notice to all members who can be identified
through reasonable effort.' ,,317 It is unlikely that the Eisen IIl decision will significantly affect notice in environmental class action because, unlike the widely dispersed classes arising out of securities frauds
and antitrust violations, classes in environmental cases tend to be geographically contiguous. Additionally, whereas in cases such as Eisen
there is usually some record of the plaintiff-class member's transaction
with the defendant which makes individual identification of the class
members (or large numbers of them) possible, there is no "transaction"
between class members and defendants in the typical case of environmental injury and, consequently, no basis for individual identification.
Thus, the usual environmental class plaintiff, because of the contiguousness of the class and the lack of a basis for individual identification,
would seem to be in a much easier position to argue that the "best
notice practicable" is notice by publication."' Nevertheless, the Second
Circuit's strict adherence to the language of rule 23(c)(2) in Eisen
Ill must not be ignored, nor should its attitude 1 9 toward large classes
be overlooked, even by the environmental plaintiff.
316. Id. at 266.
317. Nos. 72-1521, 30934, at 3234 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)). The
court of appeals also cited the Advisory Committee's Note, which stated: "Indeed,
under subdivision (c) (2), notice must be ordered, it is not merely discretionary ..
39 F.R.D. 69, 106-07 (1966).
318. "The general rule that emerges from the Mullane case is that notice by publication is not enough with respect to a person whose name and address are known
or very easily ascertainable and whose legally protected interests are directly affected
by the proceedings in question." Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 212-13
(1962).
319. The court of appeals in Eisen I noted that while "amended rule 23 provides
an excellent and workable procedure in cases where the number of members of the
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In each of the three"' environmental cases that have considered
the question, notice by publication has been found the "best notice
practicable." In the Nolop case the district court ordered" publication of notice in the University newspaper and over the University's
radio and television stations "because of the high cost of individual
mailing. '321 And in Biechele, the district court found as follows:
No list of the potential members of the class in the damage suit
was available nor could one have been compiled. Therefore the
Court determined that the best possible service would be by publication of its orders delineating the class and requiring the presentation of claims together with the notice required by Rule 23(c)
(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It was, however, determined that the publication in the Sandusky Register would not
be a standard legal notice, but would be prominently placed so
that the class members would better have the attention drawn to
it.322

Though in certain non-environmental cases the very notoriety of the
case has been held to constitute adequate notice, 323 prominent 324 publi8 25
cation will normally be required in newspapers with wide circulation
within the particular area involved. In addition to the notice required
by rule 23(c)(2), the court may utilize a second notice under rule
23(d)(2) after the defendant's liability has been established. At this
time the court may require each individual class member to file a state32 6
ment of his claim or else be barred from any recovery.
(5)
Determination and Distribution of Damages. The most
devastating argument that a defendant has against the maintenance of
a class action for damages under rule 23(b)(3) is that a determination of damages requires separate trials as to each member of the class.
This, the defendant will argue, demonstrates that common questions do
not predominate and that the class action is unmanageable. Anticiclass is not too large," Nos. 72-1521, 30924, at 3243, the very large class actions
amount to little more than procedures for "legalized blackmail." Id. at 3242. In
such a situation, "[w]here there are millions of dispersed and unidentifiable members
of the class," the use of notice by publication is "a farce." Id. at 3239.
320. Nolop v. Volpe, 333 F. Supp. 1364, 1367 (D.S.D. 1971); Zahn v. Int'l
Paper Co., 53 F.R.D. 430, 433 (D. Vt 1971), affd, 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972),
cert. granted,93 S. Ct. 1370 (1973) (No. 72-888).
321. 333 F. Supp. at 1367.
322. 309 F. Supp. at 356.
323. Johnson v. Robinson, 296 F. Supp. 1165 (N.D. Il. 1967), aff'd per curiam,
394 U.S. 847 (1969); Snyder v. Board of Trustees, 286 F. Supp. 927 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
324. See Herbst v. Able, 49 F.R.D. 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
325. See, e.g., Contract Buyers League v. F & F Investment, 48 F.R.D. 7 (N.D.
Ill. 1969).
326, 309 F. Supp. at 359,
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pating this argument, the plaintiffs must demonstrate to the court a
manner in which damages can be determined and distributed without
overtaxing the court's capabilities.
One approach, adopted in an environmental class action context
in Biecheles2 and Foster,8 28 has been the appointment of a special
master. The court in the former case appointed a local resident as
master and charged him with fixing a deadline by which time all claims
against the defendant should be filed in the form of a written statement. The master was to work with counsel in preparing forms and
instituting procedures for the filing and processing of claims, "with the
objective of reducing to a minimum the number of claims which will
have to be heard upon the evidence. ' 32 9 Where the claim could not be
stipulated, the court required that the claimant pay the cost of the 8mas0
ter's hearing if his recovery did not exceed one hundred dollars.
While such a procedure may be adequate for comparatively small
classes, it clearly is no answer where the class numbers in the thousands, and even millions. To deal with the problem of damage recoveries in large classes, a number of recent litigants have sought to remind
the courts that the class action was "an invention of equity" and that
under the merged system federal courts are free to utilize equitable
powers even where the remedy sought has been traditionally denominated as "legal."88 1 To this end, plaintiffs have asked the courts to
award a single damage recovery, consonant with the total injury inflicted by the defendant on the class or with the amount of his unjust
enrichment. Once damages have been determined in this manner, their
distribution can take one of two forms.
The first is the "lump sum recovery." After the total amount of
damages is determined, the court, with the aid of counsel, determines
an appropriate means of apportioning that amount among class members. The approach was adopted in a court-approved settlement under
rule 23 (e) in West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co.832 Defendants offered a settlement of one hundred million dollars. The court then requested, and plaintiffs responded with, plans for distribution of that
327. See text accompanying notes 247-49 and 285-90 supra.
328. See note 203 supra.
329. 309 F. Supp. at 359.
330. Id.
331. Sedler, Conditional, Experimental and Substitutional Relief, 16 RUTronas
L. REV. 639 (1962).
332. 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Coffer Drug Co. v.
Chas. Pfizer & Co., 404 U.S. 871 (1971).

1973]

ENVIRONMENTAL CLASS ACTION

1447

sum. Despite these plans some individual purchasers of drugs from defendant never presented their claims, leaving part of the lump sum undistributed. Plaintiffs, however, had also anticipated this problem by
devising a notice procedure by which consumers who did not come
forward with their claims were held to have assigned them to the attorneys general of the various states who had also been plaintiffs in the
action. The utilization of a similar device in environmental class actions for damages would seem equally useful. Courts may however,
wish to alter the so-called cy pres3 3 remedy that was utilized in Pfizer.
One possibility is to divide damages among the individual members
of the class who do, in fact, present claims; however, since it would
result in a windfall to the plaintiff, it "might encourage the bringing of
class actions likely to result in large uncollected damage pools. 3 3 4 A
more beneficial distribution would probably result from an assignment
to the state conditioned on its use of such funds3 5 for purposes specified by the court, such as maintenance of state environmental protection
agencies or research into new techniques of pollution control.
A second apportionment technique for distribution of a single
fund damage award has been termed the "fluid class recovery." It is,
essentially, only an additional variation of the cy pres remedy for
distribution of the excess portion of the damage fund not claimed by
individual class members. Although first utilized in Darr v. Yellow
Cab Co.3 36 to distribute damages after a settlement was reached, the
most notable attempt to use this distribution technique was in Eisen
v. Carlisle & Jacquelin.3 7 The district court, in determining whether
the action was maintainable as a class action, recognized that no procedure that envisaged presentation of personal claims would be manageable under the terms of rule 23(b)(3). Only some type of single333. The "cy pres" remedy, as it is used in the class action context, is an analogy
to the cy pres doctrine that is used by courts to effectuate testamentary charitable
gifts which would otherwise be invalid. See Comment, Damage Distribution in Class
Actions: The Cy Pres Remedy, 39 U. Cm. L. REv. 448, 452-53 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Cy Pres].
334. Cy Pres 453.
335. See, e.g., Market St. Ry. v. Railroad Comm'n, 28 Cal. 2d 363, 171 P.2d
875, cert. denied, 329 U.S. 793 (1946).
336. 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967). In the Daar case,
the defendant made illegal charges to persons using its services. The case was settled
under an agreement that such overcharges were to be returned to the injured customers
by way of a reduction in fares that would deplete the agreed-upon settlement fund
over a period of years. However, "Daar is an uncertain authority outside the settlement context since the court stated that the individuals injured by the overcharge
would ultimately have to prove their individual claims." Cy Pres 460 n.52.
337. 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd, Nos. 72-1521, 30934 (2d Cir., May 1,
1973). See text accompanying notes 221 and 311.-17 supra,
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sum damage recovery was possible. The district court rejected defendant's argument that a separate calculation of damage was required for
each individual plaintiff. The court said that the gross amount of damages to the entire class could be determined from defendant's records
and public documents. But a new problem had to be faced; could
it be expected that any significant portion of the class, which by 1971
numbered over six million, would come forward to claim their individual damages? If not, was this not merely a lawsuit of substantial
benefit only to the attorneys whose fees came off the top? To escape
this dilemma the court designed a "fluid class recovery. ' 3 8 Under
the procedure outlined by the court, individual class members would
have a period of time in which to prove and collect damages after a
determination of defendants' liability and the award of gross damages. After individual damages were collected, the odd-lot differential
in transactions involving defendants would be reduced by an amount
determined by the court until such time as the amount of reductions
in the odd-lot differential equaled the amount of uncollected damages.3 39 The Second Circuit termed such a method of damage distribution "fantastic" and, even if permitted by rule 23, unconstitutional because violative of due process.3 40 That court further stated:
• . . As it now reads amended Rule 23 contemplates and provides for no such procedure. Nor can amended Rule 23 be construed or interpreted in such fashion as to permit such procedure.
We hold the "fluid recovery" concept and practice to be illegal,
inadmissible as a solution of341the manageability problems of class
actions and wholly improper.
With the dismissal of Eisen, the use of the fluid class recovery
will likely be relegated once more to the drawing boards of the com338. Judge Tyler said:
Distribution of an eventual recovery to the class members in a case such
as this one need not be viewed solely in terms of personal and individual
damages and recoupment thereof
I think it appropriate, as plaintiff urges, to consider distribution of
damages to the class as a whole rather than to adopt, at this initial, planning
stage, an inflexible mold of recovery running to specific class members. To
emphasize individual recovery is to unduly stress considerations not totally
relevant to the conditions of this case, especially the small amounts of potential
recoveries by most class members, which, absent the class device, would effectively bar suit by the majority of odd-lot investors. Perhaps fortuitously,
the repetitive activity of the principals in odd-lot transactions makes it possible
to fashion a procedure which will assure that the benefits of any recovery
will flow in the main to those who bore the burden of defendants' allegedly
illegal acts.

52 F.R.D. at 264-65.
339. Cy Pres 459-60.
340. Nos. 72-1521, 30934, at 3241.
341. Id.
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mentators. Were it permitted, the advantages of the fluid class recovery are readily apparent. In class actions where members of the
class are difficult, if not impossible, to identify, it provides a method
by which members of the class who continue to deal with the defendant can share in the recovery. It also has the advantage of preventing
defendant from retaining illegal profits. But the fluid class recovery,
at least in the form utilized by the Eisen court, is inapplicable to the
environmental class action for damages. Take the example of the factory that injures plaintiffs by polluting the air where plaintiffs reside.
Plaintiffs have engaged in no "transaction" with defendant as had the
plaintiffs who bought stock through the Eisen defendants. Their misfortune was to live near defendant's factory. As a geographically defined class, they will not necessarily benefit from a reduction of the
price of goods that defendant produces. Although a gross damage
award may strip defendant of illegal profits by forcing him to "inter3 42
nalize" the external costs that his actions might cause others to bear,
the fluid class recovery technique does not guarantee any relief to
plaintiffs and certainly not in the amount which they have actually
been harmed. While some commentators would perhaps consider such
a method of apportionment despite this weakness, 343 most courts, given
a choice between lump-sum recovery and fluid class recovery, will more
likely choose the former in an environmental class action. If the state
is allowed to receive whatever residue remains after individual damages
are collected, the court can condition the use of those funds so as to
more likely ensure benefit to the class than if the uncollected damages
were distributed through the market system.
This distinction between lump sum and fluid class recovery, while
valid for the discussion above, may ultimately prove useless if the reasoning of the Second Circuit in Eisen III is followed. In using the
term "fluid recovery," the court of appeals seemed to object to the
procedure of assessing damages to "the class as a whole" rather than
to the manner of distribution to the class once such gross damages have
been calculated. 44 Such a determination of gross damages is common
to both the lump sum and fluid class recovery, and the two methods
can be distinguished only by the way in which the damages are distributed once the gross damage figure is ascertained. If the assessment of damages to "the class as a whole" is beyond the scope of rule
342. See text accompanying notes 35-56 supra.
343. Cost-Internalization419.
344. Nos. 72-1521, 30934, at 3225-9.
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23 then any method of damage distribution utilizing the cy pres technique would be possible only in a case such as Pfizer where the defendants' willingness to settle the case yields a fund determined by the
parties themselves and not by the court via rule 23.
Even if the lump sum recovery were allowed by other circuits, two
significant problems are raised by the use of these types of damage
determinations; one is common to all class actions that utilize them,
and the second, to the environmental class action in particular.
Whether defendant has a right to jury trial in a class action seeking
damages is a question faced by all subsection (b)(3) litigants. The
Supreme Court seemingly resolved the issue in Ross v. Bernhard when
it said that "it now seems settled in the lower federal courts that class
action plaintiffs [and, presumably, defendants as well] may obtain a
jury trial on any legal issues they present." 84 Although this statement
was only dictum, it now seems clear that where plaintiff sues on an
historically legal cause of action, such as a suit for money damages,
the jury trial right is preserved even if the claim is brought in the form
of a class action.340 Thus, where defendant has a right to jury trial,
it would seem possible that he could defeat damage determination by a
master, lump-sum recovery, or fluid class recovery simply by demanding his seventh amendment right.Y4" Professors Wright and Miller are
convinced that separate submission of the liability and damage issues
to a jury does not violate the seventh amendment, nor, they believe,
is the submission of issues separately to different juries constitutionally
proscribed.3 48 They warn, however, that
separate trial of a particular issue cannot be ordered in the first
instance where the issue is so interwoven with the other issues
that it cannot be submitted to the jury independently of the others
without confusion and uncertainty which would amount to a denial
of a fair trial.349
Subject to the above warning, plaintiffs will probably be able to
satisfy the seventh amendment demands in cases where the lump sum
or fluid class recovery devices are utilized. These devices can probably escape any seventh amendment challenge simply by allowing a
345. 396 U.S. 531, 541 (1970).
346. See Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc.
v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
347. It should be noted that the jury trial right also calls into question the use
of the class action on particular issues which rule 23(c)(4) affords to the court to
help facilitate manageability.
348. 9 WRIGHT & MILLER § 2391, at 302-03; 7A WRIGHT & MILLER § 1801, at 269.
349. 9 WRIGHT & MILLER § 2391, at 303.
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single jury to determine liability and award the damage sum as well;
there appears to be no reason why two juries are required. A different question is presented when the use of special masters is involved.
Such a procedure very clearly denies defendant his right to a jury determination of damages. "Thus, it must be used only in the most exceptional circumstances to be certain that the policies of the Seventh
Amendment are not violated."35 0
The most crucial problem that plaintiffs must face in convincing
a court to utilize the single damage award is demonstrating how a total
damage figure can be calculated. Unlike the consumer class action,
such as Eisen, the plaintiffs cannot point to defendants' records and
public documents as a reliable indicator of their total damages. While
it is true that courts have not required certainty of damages where there
is injury in fact and reasonable evidence upon which to estimate total
injury, the plaintiffs must produce proof sufficient to make a "just
and reasonable inference" as to the amount of their damages.3" 1 For
the environmental plaintiff this will undoubtedly be a difficult and expensive task, if it is possible at all.
Suppose a factory were emitting pollutants into the air. Even
if plaintiffs could prove how much of the pollutant had been emitted
during the period in which damages are to be calculated, how could
they determine the amount of damages? Certainly traditional methods of proof are of no avail. Where the individual damages issues are
to be handled by a master, plaintiffs could offer scientific testimony
as to the types of damage that could be caused by the particular pollutant and the area that such a pollutant would be likely to affect.
Such testimony would serve as independent verification of the asserted
claims. 3 2 This approach was employed in the Biechele case, in which
expert witnesses were used to establish a model of pollution dispersion
to aid the court in determining the membership of the class. Further
350. 7A WRIaHT & MILLER § 1801, at 269. Even if the damage determination
procedure were found to be violative of the traditional concept of right to jury trial,
Professors Wright and Miller suggest that such concepts should be modified where the
class action would otherwise be disallowed. They argue as follows: Simplifying the
process of establishing individual claims may be the only way of making it economically
feasible for class members to come forward and assert their rights and some of the
procedural patterns that are considered fundamental when the litigation involves the
single plaintiff and a single defendant will have to be abandoned. Id. § 1784, at
122-23.
351. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563
(1931).
352. The use of expert witnesses to corroborate proffered testimony is discussed
in 2 J. WIm
GOE,
EVIDENCE §§ 445-60 (3d ed. 1940).
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expert testimony in Biechele was utilized to indicate the boundaries of
actual causation.3 5 3 This approach is useful, however, only when individual class members present their claims before any determination
of the amount of damages is made. It would not be useful in projecting
damages for a lump-sum damage award.
Two possible approaches for projecting a gross damage figure
in environmental class actions are indicated by the Federal Judicial
Center's Manual for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation. The court
may attempt to approximate a damage sum based on statistical sampling techniques.3 5 4 The Coordinating Committee for Multidistrict Litigation has concluded:
Scientifically designed samples and polls, meeting the tests of necessity and trustworthiness, are useful adjuncts to conventional
methods of proof and may contribute materially to shortening the
trial of the complex case.8 55
If such a sample can be accurately designed, plaintiffs might argue
that individual claims need not be analyzed.3 56 Whether or not a court
would admit such evidence, by itself, as proof of the amount of damages to a large class, especially when large sums of money are involved,
must be seriously doubted.
Plaintiffs may also attempt to make use of computer analysis.
Models of adverse health effects in various urban environments have
already been extensively developed.3 57 These include estimates of damages. Such a model might be used in combination with geographically
particularized pollution dispersion evidence, such as that relied upon in
Biechele,358 and the statistical sampling method discussed above. A
computer might be able to analyze these various types of data. The
Coodinating Committee for Multidistrict Litigation recognized the possible usefulness of such an approach when it stated:
353. See text accompanying notes 289-90 supra.
354. Such proof is admissible, if its reliability can be adequately demonstrated,
within exceptions to the hearsay rule "where otherwise great practical inconvenience
would be experienced in making the desired proof." United States v. Aluminum Co.
of America, 35 F. Supp. 820, 824 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
355. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX AND MULTIDisTRIcT LiTi-

§ 2.612 (rev. ed. 1970).
356. McCoid, The Admissibility of Sample Data Into a Court of Law: Some
Further Thoughts, 4 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 233, 236 n.11 (1957). See generally Sorensen &
Sorensen, The Admissibility and Use of Opinion Research Evidence, 28 N.Y.U.L. REV.
1213 (1953); cf. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 680-81
(S.D.N.Y. 1963).
357. See, e.g., OFICE OF RESEARCH AND MoNTroRNG, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, COMMUNITY HALTH ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES (1972).
358. See text accompanying notes 289-90 supra.
GATION
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Computer analyses of masses of raw data are becoming increasingly valuable sources of evidence and their use and admissibility
should be promoted and facilitated in complex cases. 359
The use of such devices for projecting a single sum recovery in
environmental class actions is completely untested,8 60 at least as far as
the reported cases reveal. Their success or failure depends largely on

the ingenuity of counsel and the attitude of the courts. If the social
costs of pollution and other environmental hazards become more widely
recognized, courts may be willing to consider such arguments. However, as the Eisen case demonstrates problems of guaranteeing the accuracy of such techniques and insuring the fairness to the defendant
of the procedures developed appear to be almost insurmountable. The
use of the lump sum and fluid class recovery in environmental class actions is, at best, a dark horse-worth a try, but not expected to win.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In a period of increasing concern about the despoilation of the
environment, the class action has great potential as a tool to slow the
process of degradation and to make accountable those primarily responsible for environmental harm. Unfortunately, in the federal courts
this potential is largely illusory and may never be realized. A major
threshold burden is the jurisdictional amount requirement as it has
been interpreted in several recent decisions. Indeed, if the Supreme
Court affirms Zahn v. InternationalPaper Co.,361 the representative suit
for damages is effectively dead.
Even if the jurisdictional hurdles can be surmounted, plaintiffs
contemplating a class suit for damages must contend with the difficulties inherent in rule 23. Delineation of the class and the adequacy
of representation by the named plaintiffs are the most troublesome requirements under rule 23(a), and the class will face even more trying
problems in establishing the predominance of common issues, the manageability of the suit, and the adequacy of notice under rule 23(b)(3).
Nevertheless, the authors believe that some class suits for damages are
appropriate for class treatment. A good example is the Zahn case it359. FEDERAL JUDICLAL CENTER, supra note 350, at § 2.614.
360. The authors wish to acknowledge the contribution to the discussion of damage distribution made by a brief prepared by the National Moot Court team of the
Georgetown University Law Center and submitted in the 1972 National Moot Court
Competition, sponsored by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. This
brief was especially suggestive of methods for calculating gross damages.
361. 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. granted 95 S. Ct. 1370 (1973).
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self, in which a relatively compact and clearly identifiable group of
waterfront property owners alleged direct harm to property caused by
one industrial polluter. A court willing to give a liberal, but not unreasonable, reading of rule 23 could further significant economic and
social goals-cost internalization, relief for small claimants, and more
rapid reduction in pollution-by allowing such a suit to proceed as a
class action. Responsible environmental litigators must choose their
cases with care and educate rather than intimidate the courts if any
class actions for damages are to succeed.
The class action for injunctive relief under rule 23(b)(1) or (2)
is more likely to succeed under the present state of the law. The jurisdictional amount requirement can probably be sidestepped by using
the "defendant's viewpoint" or the right to a clean environment as the
matter in controversy. Plaintiffs need not worry about the requirements of predominance, manageability, and best possible notice in injunctive suits. Nevertheless, skilled defense counsel could still delay
a trial for months and add considerably to its cost by raising other procedural objections to a given class suit. More significantly, its use also
encourages adverse determination by hostile judges, who are sometimes
only too glad to cloak substantative dismissal in the garb of procedural
defect.
While several justifications for the use of class actions to secure injunctive relief have been suggested, the problems mentioned above compel responsible litigators to consider substitutes for the representative
suit. In the typical suit to enjoin official action or halt pollution, a
single plaintiff can obtain relief of exactly the same scope as could a
plaintiff class of thousands. There is little possibility of less than total
relief and hence, unlike the damages action, less need for a large group
of complaints. If the weight of numbers is considered essential
convince a judge that he faces a significant issue or to prevail in the
"balancing of equities," an organizational plaintiff such as the Sierra
Club or the Environmental Defense Fund might be enlisted. Sierra
Club v. Morton,86 though initially decried, may actually have opened
the door for more suits by such organizations.
The full flowering of the environmental class action may eventually occur in the state courts. The greatest single obstacle to federal
class suits, the jurisdictional amount requirements, has no parallel under state law. Victories have recently been reported for plaintiffs in
362. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).

